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Summary  findings
Peria  and Schmukler  examine  the banking  industries  of  small  insured depositors  - who punish  risky  banks  by
Argentina,  Chile,  and Mexico  to see if market discipline  withdrawing  their deposits.
existed  there in the 1980s  and 1990s.  Standardized  coefficients  and variance  decomposition
Using  a set of bank panel data, they test for the  of deposits  indicate  that bank fundamentals  are at least as
presence  of market  discipline  by studying  whether  important as other factors  affecting  deposits.
depositors  punish risky  banks  by withdrawing  their  GMM  estimates  confirm  that the results  are robust to
deposits.  the potential endogeneity  of bank fundamentals.
They find that across  countries  and across  deposit
insurance  schemes,  market  discipline  exists even  among
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Abstract
This paper examines  the existence of market discipline  in the banking industries  of Argentina,
Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s.  Using a bank panel data set, we test for the
presence  of market discipline  by studying  whether depositors  punish risky banks by withdrawing
their deposits. We find that across countries and across deposit insurance schemes, market
discipline exists even among small, insured depositors. Standardized  coefficients  and variance
decomposition  of deposits indicate that bank fundamentals  are at least as important as other
factors affecting deposits. GMM estimations  confirm  that the results are robust to the potential
endogeneity  of bank fundamentals.
Over the last two decades,  both developed  and developing  countries  have endured  severe
banking  crises.  The U.S. savings  and loans (S&Ls)  debacle,  the Chilean  banking  crisis in the 1980s,
the Argentine  and Mexican  crises  in the mid-1980s  and 1990s,  as well  as the current  financial  stress
in a  number of Asian economies  and in Russia are only a  few examples. At all times and,
particularly,  in order to avoid banking crises, regulators  need to find ways to promote prudent
behavior  by banks. Typically  countries  coming out of banking crises, or trying to prevent  them,
tighten supervision  and prudential  regulations.  Alternatively,  rather than depending  exclusively  on
regulatory  action,  banking  authorities  can  also increase  their reliance  on market  discipline  to oversee
banks.
Market  discipline  in the banking  sector can be described  as a situation in which private
sector  agents  (stockholders,  depositors,  or creditors  at large)  face  costs  that are increasing  in the risks
undertaken  by banks and take action on the basis of these costs (Berger, 1991). For example,
uninsured  depositors,  who are exposed  to bank risk-taking,  may penalize  riskier  banks by requiring
higher  interest  rates  or by withdrawing  their deposits.
There are a number of potential social benefits from enhancing  market discipline  in a
country's banking sector.  First, by punishing bank risk-taking,  increased market discipline  may
reduce  the moral hazard incentives,  wvhich  government  guarantees  create for banks to undertake
excessive  risks.  Second,  market discipline  may improve  the efficiency  of banks  by pressuring  some
1of the relatively  inefficient  banks to become more  efficient  or to exit the industry  (Berger,  1991).
Finally,  the social  cost of supervising  banks may be lowered  if regulators  ceded greater control  to
market  forces  that can  tell "good"  from "bad" banks.  In particular,  the market  is an anonymous  and
constant overseer,  which is hard to lobby for forbearance,  and may react more quickly than
regulators  to increases  in bank risk-taking.
The potential  benefits of market discipline  could be particularly  important  in developing
countries,  where banks intermediate  the majority  of funds.  However,  little is known  regarding  the
existence  of market  discipline  in developing  countries.  This is the subject  of this paper.  Specifically,
this study  tests the existence  of market discipline  in the Argentine,  Chilean,  and Mexican  banking
industries in the 1980s  and  1990s.  Using a bank panel data set, this paper examines whether
depositors  punish banks for "bad" behavior,  by withdrawing  their deposits from risky banks. In
particular,  we estimate reduced  form equations  of individual  bank deposits as functions  of bank
fundamentals,  bank systemic  and macroeconomic  variables.  We conduct  estimations  for the period
before, during, and after banking crises. Whenever possible, we  estimate separate equations
according  to the size  of deposits,  their currency  denomination,  and the type  of guarantee  that protects
them. We obtain  between  and within  estimators  of the parameters,  and we test the  joint significance
of bank fundamentals.  Additionally,  we calculate standardized  coefficients  and we measure the
variance  of deposits  explained  by bank  fundamentals.  These  two approaches  enable  us to determine
the relative importance  of bank risk characteristics  vis-a-vis other factors that explain deposits.
Finally, we test the robustness  of our results and control for the potential endogeneity  of bank
fundamentals  by conducting  Generalized  Method of Moments  (GMM)  estimations,  as proposed  by
Arellano  and Bover  (1995).
A number of factors make the banking sectors of Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico very
interesting  to study market discipline.  First, in the last two decades,  these countries  have endured
severe  banking  crises. All three countries  underwent  banking  crises in the 1980s,  while Argentina
2and Mexico  experienced  a recent  crisis in 1994-95.  Second,  the banking  sectors  in the  three countries
have suffered important  transformations,  mainly as a  result of the banking crises and due to
subsequent  changes  in their regulatory  frameworks.  Third,  these countries  exhibit  different  deposit
insurance  systems,  which have changed over the last two dlecades.  Fourth, these countries  have
adopted different exchange rate regimes over time, implying different monetary policies and
different  capabilities  of central  banks  to act as lenders  of last  resort. Finally,  it seems  appropriate  to
conduct  a study of market discipline  for Argentina,  Chile,  and Mexico,  since these countries  have
made significant  efforts to promote  the role of market forces in regulating  banks. In the last two
decades,  bank supervisors  in these countries  have taken steps towards improving  the quality and
availability  of information  on banks. Recently,  policymakers  have been searching  for new ways of
summarizing  information  to improve  market  discipline  --like requiring  the issuance  of subordinated
debt and  the regular  rating  of banks  by external  agencies.
Not only are the Argentine,  Chilean, and Mexican  banking  sectors interesting  to study in
their own  right,  but also the cross-country  comparison  allows  us to analyze  important  questions.  For
example,  we examine  whether  the extent of market discipline  is related  to different  regulatory  and
macroeconomic  environments.  In particular,  we attempt  to address  the issue  of whether  certain  types
of deposit  insurance  schemes  undermine  market  discipline.
The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  II presents  an overview  of the
literature  on market discipline.  Section  III describes  the empirical  methodology  used in this study.
Section  IV provides  a description  of the data. Section  V presents  the empirical  results. Section  VI
studies  the relative  importance  of market discipline  vis-a-vis  systemic  and macroeconomic  factors.
Section  VII  tests whether  the results  are  robust  to endogeneity.  Section  VIII  concludes.
3II - Literature on Market Discipline
Most of the existing  academic  studies on market discipline  focus on the experience  of the
U.S. commercial banking industry over the last two decades. Flannery (1998) provides an
excellent survey  of this literature.  Several  of the papers that examine  market  discipline  in the U.S.,
analyze  whether  banks pay a risk premium on their uninsured  bank liabilities.  Baer and Brewver
(1986),  Hannan and Hanweck  (1988),  and Ellis and Flannery  (1992),  among  others, analyze  how
yields  on uninsured  deposits  respond  to bank risk-taking  as captured  by balance  sheet  and by market
measures  of risk.' Overall,  these papers support the hypothesis  that yields on uninsured  deposits
contain  risk premia. This evidence  means that uninsured  depositors  charge higher interest  rates to
riskier  banks.  Furthermore,  Cook  and Spellman  (1994)  provide  evidence  of risk pricing  even among
insured  depositors.
While  the studies  mentioned  above  analyze  the degree  of market  discipline  by focusing  only
on the interest rates paid by commercial  banks, other studies have examined  this question  by
concentrating  on the level or change of uninsured deposits. Goldberg  and Hudgins  (1996), for
examnple,  analyze  the behavior of uninsured  deposits at S&Ls associations  during 1984-89.  The
authors'  goal is to uncover  whether  depositors  adjust  their  holdings  of uninsured  deposits  in response
to indications  of impending  institutional  failure. The results  show that depositors  reduce  uninsured
holdings  at institutions  that are failing,  that is, healthy S&Ls attract more uninsured  deposits  than
failing  S&Ls.
Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani  (1998) combine both approaches  mentioned  above.
These  papers study  market  discipline  by looking  at the effect  of depository's  institution  risk on both
the pricing  and growth  of uninsured  deposits.  Both studies  find that riskier  banks  pay higher  interest
rates,  but at the same  time they attract  smaller  amounts  of uninsured  deposits.
The evidence  on the existence  of risk premia on subordinated  notes and debentures,  rather
than deposits,  is more  mixed.  Avery,  Belton,  and Golberg  (1988)  and Gorton  and Santomero  (1990)
4fail to identify  risk premia in the spreads  of subordinated  notes and debentures.  However,  Flannery
and Sorescu  (1996) point out that both of these studies use dlata  from the 1983-84  period, during
which subordinated  note and  debenture investors may halve felt protected by  a  conjectural
government  guarantee  on such securities.  On the other  hand, Flannery  and Sorescu  (1996)  examine
subordinated  note and debenture spreads  over varying windows between 1983 and 1991. They
document  a significant  relationship  between  several  balance  sheet  and income  statement  risk proxies
and yield  spreads  for the overall  period  and, in particular,  for the 1989-91  window.
Whereas  the literature  on market discipline  is quite vast for the U.S., significantly  fewer
papers  have  been  written  on this subject  for the case  of developing  countries?  The main contributors
to this market discipline literature are Valdes and Lomakin (1988), Schumacher  (1996), and
D'Amato,  Grubisic,  and Powell  (1997).
Valdes and Lomakin (1988) examine whether, during 1987, depositors in the Chilean
financial  system  continued  to act as if all claims  were insured  by the government,  despite  the fact that
a law was passed  in 1986  providing  insurance  only to small depositors.  Throughout  1981-1986,  the
government  guaranteed  the deposits  of practically  all banks  that failed during  that period.  However,
in 1986,  a new law was passed  that limited  the insurance  coverage  to deposits  under around  2,000
dollars.  Using  panel data on implicit  interest  rates paid on deposits  during 1987-1988,  Valdes and
Lomakin  fail to reject  the null that depositors  did not require  riskier  banks  to pay higher  interest  rates.
Consequently,  the authors conclude  that depositors  behaved  as if they continued  to enjoy  the pre-
1986  full deposit  insurance  guarantee,  even  though  the 1986  law limited  deposit  insurance  coverage.
Schumacher  (1996) studies  the 1994-95  Argentine  banking  crisis. Using  a bank-level  data
set, she first estimates  probabilities  of bank failure. Then, she examines  whether  these probabilities
have an impact  on deposit  behavior  over the course of the 1995  Argentine  banking  crisis. Overall,
Schumacher  finds  that the probability  of failure  is explained  by the ratio  of non-performing  loans,  the
return  on assets,  and a number  of variables  measuring  liquidity.  In the second  step of her estimation,
5Schumacher  finds  that the probability  of bank failure  negatively  affects  the behavior  of deposits,  in
particular,  during  the peak of the crisis in March 1995.  For the pre-panic  period (i.e.,  during 1994,
excluding  December),  she  finds  that riskier  banks  paid  higher  interest  rates  on deposits3
D'Amato, Grubisic,  and Powell (1997) estimate  a two-way random effects model using
daily deposit  data for a sample  of 120  Argentine  banks,  over a four month  period surrounding  the
1995 banking crisis. The main objective of this paper is to test the presence of contagion in
depositors'  behavior.  First, the authors  estimate  a random  effects  model  of daily changes  in deposits
as a function  of a number  of macro  variables  (which  vary over  time but not across  banks)  and bank
fundamentals  (which  take values  for November  1994).  For this initial  panel estimation,  the authors
find that a Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange  Multiplier  test indicates  that even  after accounting  for the role of
macro  and bank specific  variables,  there  remain  significant  random  time effects.  However,  once  they
model  contagion  explicitly  by including  lagged  movements  of deposits  in various  groups  of banks
(cooperative,  foreign,  and public),  they cannot reject the hypothesis  that there is no random  time
effect  remaining.  The  authors  interpret  their  results as evidence  of contagion  in depositor  behavior  in
Argentina  during  the 1995-banking  crisis.
The existing empirical literature related to market discipline in Latin America can be
summarized  as follows.  Valdes and Lomakin  (1988)  focus on interest rate changes  associated  with
bank riskiness. Schumacher  (1996) analyzes how deposits across banks are affected by their
probability  of failure.  D'Amato  et al study contagion  effects  in depositors'  behavior,  controlling  for
macroeconomic  factors  and for the level of bank fundamentals  at the beginning  of their sample.
While extremely  informative,  these studies  have a number  of limitations  as far as the objectives  of
this paper  are  concemed.
First, Schumacher's  two-step approach  to  analyze deposit growth (i.e., first estimate a
probability  of failure  and then study  how  this probability  affects  deposit  growth)  makes  it impossible
to determine  specifically  which  bank  risk variables  (if any) affect  depositors'  behavior.  Second,  both
6Valdes and Lomakin and Schumacher  fail to allow in their analysis for the potential role that
macroeconomic  and bank systemic  factors  can play in affecting  interest  rates or deposit  behavior,
respectively.  Given that three of the four periods we study coincide  with macroeconomic  crises,
recognizing  the potential  role of these factors in affecting  deposits  is very important.  Third,  while
D'Amato et al. control  for the role of bank fundamentals,  macroeconomic,  and contagion  effects,
given  that fundamentals  are fixed  in their paper,  the authors  cannot  adequately  study  the response  of
deposits  to changes  in bank risk indicators  over time. Fourth,  D'ALmato  et al. as well as Schumacher
do not discriminate  between  insured  and uninsured  deposits.  This may be problematic  because  these
two types of depositors  may have different  incentives  to monitor and, consequently,  to discipline
bank risk-taking.  Given that uninsured depositors' claims are iunprotected  in the event of bank
failures, we expect them to have greater incentives  to monitor bank activities.  By studying  the
behavior  of total deposits  (even after  the introduction  of deposit  insurance),  both studies  mentioned
above  are implicitly  constraining  their models  of deposits  to be the same  for insured  and uninsured
depositors.  Fifth, none of the studies mentioned  above analyze  the relative importance  of bank
fundamentals  vis-a-vis other factors affecting deposits, nor clo they control for the potential
endogeneity  of bank fundamentals  in their estimations.  Finally,  the previous  papers are unable  to
make  cross-country  comparisons.
The  analysis  in the remainder  of this paper  studies  market  discipline  in Argentina,  Chile,  and
Mexico  by concentrating  on the response  of deposits  to changes  in bank specific  fundamentals.  At
the same time, we control for factors affecting  the macroeconomic  environment  in which banks
operate  and for the behavior  of deposits  in the overall  banking  system.  In particular,  using  panel  data
for banks in Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico,  we focus on how changes in bank fundamentals,  over
time  and  across banks, affect  individual bank  deposits. Also,  to  determine whether the
responsiveness  of depositors  to bank risk is affected  by the type  of guarantees  that depositors  enjoy,
7we discriminate  between insured  and uninsured deposits.  Finally,  we explore the hypothesis  that
large  depositors  tend  to discipline  banks  more  than  small  depositors  do.
m  - Empirical Methodology
This section is devoted to a discussion of the empirical methodology  we use to study
market discipline. We estimate the following reduced forn  equation for bank deposits in each
country  separately.
DEP,,  =  ,t  + cS'SYS,  + y'MA4  CRO,  + /3'BANK 111 +V1,  (1)
Vj,  - N(O,  f,2)
such that i =  1,...,N and  t =  1,..., T.
DEP,, represents  individual  bank deposits of bank i at time t. N is the number  of banks in
each country.  The  panel is unbalanced,  so T --the number  of observations  per bank-- varies  across
banks. SYS, stands for the systemic variable, while MACRO, is a vector of macroeconomic
variables. Both the systemic  and the macroeconomic  variables change over time but not across
individuals.  BANKj,,l  is a vector of bank fundamentals.  This vector is included with a lag, to
account for the fact that balance  sheet information  is available  to the public with a certain  clelay.
pi stands  for each bank's specific or fixed effect. Thus, according  to equation (1), bank deposits
are determined  by three main factors:  the behavior of deposits in the overall banking  systenm,  the
developments  in the macro economy,  and the evolution  of the bank risk characteristics  (or bank
fundamentals).
We report  between  and within  estimators  of equation  (1). Between  estimators  are obtained
by regressing  the mean of deposits of each bank on mean values  of the explanatory  variables.  In
other words, for each individual  we compute the mean of each variable over time. Then, we
calculate a cross-section  ordinary least square (OLS) on the means. The results allow us to
compare deposit  behavior  across banks. For instance, the between  estimators enable us to study
8whether banks with stronger fundamentals  attract more deposits. Given that the systemic and
macroeconomic  regressors  only vary over time but not across individuals,  we only include bank
specific  variables  in the between  estimations.  The equations  for Argentina  encompass  between  82
to 162  banks, while  33 to 40 banks  are contained  in the estimations  for Chile.  On the other hand,
the equations for Mexico include 12 to  38 banks. We conduct between estimations only for
Argentina,  since  we need enough  degrees  of freedom  to obtain reliable  estimates.
While between estimators exploit differences across banks, within estimators highlight
the variation  of deposits over time. Within estimators study deviations from each bank's mean.
For instance, within estimators indicate how deviations from the average bank fundamentals
affect deviations of deposits from their mean. Within estimates are obtained by including a
dummy  variable  for each  bank, which controls  for bank mean  deposits.
The results from the between  and within estimates  have two different interpretations.  The
between estimates  tell us how bankj 's deposits would change if bank]j became  bank h. On the
other hand, the within estimates  tell us how bankj's deposits  would react if bankj 's fundamentals
(or other variables  in the equation)  changed  over time, given its mean deposits.  Heteroskedastic-
consistent  standard  errors are calculated,  both in the between  and within  regressions.
To test the joint significance  of the macroeconomic  variables, we compute and report  the
corresponding  F-test  statistics from the within estimations. Given that the  macroeconomic
variables may be correlated  with each other, we may fail to find that any of these variables  are
individually  significant.  The F-test for the joint significance  of macroeconomic  variables should
allow us to determine if these variables have a joint significant  impact on deposits, even when
some of them might not be individually  significant.  We also compute and report similar F-tests
for the joint significance  of bank fundamentals,  excluding  the logarithm  of bank assets. The latter
is included  to control for possible scale effects, since  typically larger banks  attract more  deposits.
9In reporting  the joint significance  of bank fundamentals,  we omit the logarithm  of bank assets,
since  this variable  is not a measure  of bank risk per se.
The within estimates  control for individual  fixed effects.  We conduct  two tests associated
with these parameters.  First, we test the joint significance  of the individual  fixed effects and we
report the corresponding  F-statistic. Second, we conduct a Hausman (1978) test to evaluate the
validity of including  individual  fixed effects  rather than estimating  a random-effects  model. The
corresponding  test statistic  is distributed  as a chi-square,  which we label "Chi-Hausman."  In most
cases, the tests show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly
significant. Therefore, we report only the fixed-effects models, because the random-effects
specification  would  yield biased  coefficients.
Whenever  possible, we estimate  various specifications  of equation  (1) for each country,
dividing the estimates by size of deposits, time periods, and currency denomination.  First, we
distinguish  between insured and uninsured deposits. This distinction is important in a study of
market discipline, since a-priori we would expect to find differences in the degree of market
discipline across these two types of depositors. Assuming the deposit insurance scheme is
credible,  one can expect insured depositors  to have fewer incentives  to monitor bank risk-taking.
However,  if the deposit  guarantee  is not credible  or if there are costs associated  with the recovery
of deposits  following  a bank failure,  we may find evidence  that insured depositors  enforce  nmarket
discipline. On the other hand, uninsured depositors' claims are not protected by the deposit
guarantee,  so in theory  we expect  these depositors  to withdraw  their funds  from risky banks.
Two other sets of specifications  are estimated. Among uninsured deposits --which are
larger than insured deposits--  we distinguish  between medium and large deposits. Our goal is to
study whether there are differences across these groups. Furthermore, we divide the sample
period  to test for the presence  of market discipline  before,  during, and after banking  crises. ][n  the
case of Argentina  and Chile,  we compute  separate  regressions  for local currency  (peso) and U.S.
10dollar deposits. For the regressions in local currency,  deposits and assets are expressed  in real
terms (adjusted by the consumer price index) in order to control for the potential growth in
nominal  figures  that can be due to inflation.
To compare  the relative importance  of the bank fundamentals  vis-A-vis  the macro and
systemic variables, we compute standardized  coefficients.  These coefficients  are obtained by
transforming  all variables (using each bank's mean and standard deviation) and by estimating
equation (1) without bank dummies. Standardized  coefficients are unit free coefficients and,
therefore, can be  compared across regressors. We also calculate the variance of  deposits
explained  by bank fundamentals  as an alternative  measure  of their relative  impact.
Our methodology assumes that bank risk, systemic, and macroeconomic  variables are
exogenous. However, under certain circumstances,  bank ftndamentals may be endogenously
determined.  If so, the estimated  coefficients  will be biased and inconsistent.  The specification  in
equation (1) captures  the fact that bank risk characteristics  are only known to depositors  with a
certain  delay. This lag structure mitigates  the potential problem  of endogeneity.  In this scenario,
endogeneity  can only take place if bankers anticipate  depositors' reaction. To address  this issue
and to check for the robustness  of the results we conduct GMM estimations, as proposed  by
Arellano  and Bover  (1995).  The GMM  estimations  are explained  and reported  in Section  VII.
As mentioned  above, depositors can exercise market discipline  on banks through two
channels:  by requiring  higher interest  rates and/or  by withdrawing  their deposits  from risky banks.
Even though most papers on market discipline  focus either on interest rates or on the quantity  of
deposits,  in order to measure  the full extent of market discipline,  it is necessary  to examine  the
behavior  of both  variables. 4 Only  when  one of these  variables  is completely  inelastic,  is it adequate  to
focus  exclusively  on the behavior  of the other  variable.
The approach  pursued by this paper focuses on quantity responses  due to the lack of
adequate  data on interests  rates paid by each bank on deposits.  For the countries  we examine,  the
11only readily available bank level information on interest rates is an implicit rate rather than a market
rate. This implicit rate is calculated as the share of interest rate expenses over the total amount of
deposits. This proxy for the true market rate paid on deposits does not allow us to discriminate across
currency denomination, maturity, or size of deposits. Moreover, the interest rate data do not enable
us to distinguish between insured and uninsured deposits.
Under certain  circumstances, focusing  only  on  changes  in the  quantity of  deposits to
measure the extent of market discipline might be the appropriate approach. For example, in situations
of asymmetric information and adverse selection, depositors may prefer to adjust to changes in the
perception of banks' risk via changes in quantity rather than by accepting higher interest rates (a la
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this context, if banks are unable to raise interest rates sufficiently to
compensate depositors for the perceived risk, or if banks decide not to increase interest rates to hide
their risky situations, interest rates paid by banks on deposits will be imperfect indicators of market
discipline.
In  the  cases where  interest  rates  cease  to  be  useful  indicators  of  market  discipline,
examining whether riskier banks attract fewer deposits is a complete test of the existence and the
degree of market discipline.  However, in general, such a test would require that we  study the
behavior of both interest rates and deposits.  Even though our focus on the quantity of deposits
does not allow us to measure the full extent of depositors' response to bank risk, our study does
provide a test of the existence  of market discipline. If we find that  indeed riskier banks attract
fewer deposits, we can interpret this finding as evidence of market discipline.
IV - The Data
Three  types  of  data  are  used  in  this  study,  namely:  bank  specific,  systemic,, and
macroeconomic variables. The bank-specific data used in this study come from the Central Bank
of Argentina, the Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras (Argentina), the Superintendencia de
12Bancos e  Instituciones Financieras (Chile), the Comision Nacional Bancaria y  de  Valores
(Mexico). 5 These agencies oversee banks. Banking sector data were also obtained from these
sources.  Macroeconomic  and systemic  data come both from the Argentine  Central Bank and the
Ministry of Finance, as well as from the International  Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund. Bank specific data are usually quarterly, although  some variables appear on a
monthly basis. We estimate  the models with quarterly data, except for Chile during the 1980s,
when monthly data is available. All the bank specific balance sheet information is collected
regularly,  but published  and available  to the public with a lag of around  2 months.
IV.A  - Bank Level Variables
The vector BANKj,,, contains several bank-specific  fiundamentals  which are intended  to
measure banks' risk exposure. The variables included are akin to those used in the CAMEL rating
system  of  banks  (where  CAMEL  stands  for  capital  adequacy,  asset  quality,  management,
earnings, and liquidity). Capital adequacy is measured by the capital to assets ratio. We expect the
capital adequacy variable to have a positive effect  on bank deposits. A number of indicators are
used as measures of asset quality. A clear signal of asset quality is the ratio of non-performing to
total loans. This ratio measures the percentage of loans a bank might have to write off as losses.
We expect this variable to have a negative impact on deposits.
The concentration of bank's  loan portfolio also captures the quality of the assets held by
banks. In general a large exposure to a vulnerable sector, like real estate, raises banks' risks. On
the other hand, because most real estate  sector loans are mortgage loans (i.e.,  loans where the
assets in question serve as collateral), it is possible that these loans can be considered safer than
others. Thus, it is a priori unclear what impact we expect the ratio of real estate  loans to total
loans to have  on deposit  behavior. We  face a  similar uncertainty when  analyzing personal  or
consumption loans. These loans are typically granted without collateral. However, they may be
13easier to recall than other loans (like mortgage loans), given that consumption  loans are usually
smaller  and have a shorter  maturity.  Consequently,  one might expect a rise in this type of lending
to  indicate either an  increase or a  decrease in the risk exposure of banks. Ex-ante, then,
consumption  loans might  have either a positive  or a negative  impact  on deposits.
We measure  banks' profitability  by the return on assets ratio. In general,  assuming  we are
adequately  controlling  for risk, we expect this variable  to have a positive  effect on deposits. The
efficiency of banks is measured by the ratio of non-interest expenditures  to total assets. Less
efficient  banks are expected  to have higher expenditures.  However, it is also the case that banks
that offer a better service  to customers  might have higher  expenditures  to total assets. If we could
control for the quality of service,  we would expect an increase in non-interest  expenditures  to
have a negative effect on deposits. In our case, given that we cannot control for the quality of
bank services,  the effect of this variable  is undetermined.
The cash to assets ratio is included  as an indicator  of banks' liquidity.  In general, banks
with a large volume of liquid assets are perceived  to be safer, since these assets would allow a
bank to meet unexpected  withdrawals.  In this sense, controlling  for other factors,  we expect more
liquid banks  to suffer fewer deposit  withdrawals.  To the extent that one can consider  the bonds  to
assets ratio as a measure of liquidity,  we would expect this variable to have a positive  effect on
bank deposits. Finally, in order to control for the size of banks, the logarithm  of bank assets is
included in the regressions.  If larger banks are perceived as being more solid, we expecl:  this
variable  to positively  affect bank deposits.  As mentioned  above,  we include  the logarithm  of bank
assets as a control  variable  and not as a measure of bank risk.
IV.B - Systemic and Macroeconomic Variables
In order to control  for the behavior  of the overall banking  sector, our estimations  include
the ratio of cash outside  banks  to system  deposits.  We believe  this variable  provides  a preliminary
14way of testing for "contagion" effects. Contagion refers to  a  situation in which individual
depositors  at a given bank act according to what the rest of the banking system appears to be
doing, after controlling  for bank specific and macroeconomic  factors. Cash outside banks over
system deposits  reflects individuals'  preference  for holding  currency  relative  to bank deposits.  If
depositors  perceive an increase in systemic risks, they might decide to withdraw their deposit
from banks regardless of their fundamentals.  The value ofL  cash outside banks over system
deposits will increase and individual  bank deposits will fall. Therefore, a negative correlation
between individual bank deposits and cash outside banks can be interpreted as evidence of
systemic  or contagion  effects.
Deposits  at individual  banks can also be influenced  by the state of the overall economy.
Thus, we control  for the impact  of macroeconomic  variables. In particular,  we evaluate  the effect
of central bank reserves (as a share of M2) and the stock market index on the quantity of bank
deposits.  We also include the interest  rate differential  to control  for exchange  rate expectations  of
devaluation.
V - Empirical  Results
Argentina:
Table I  (A and B) and Table II  (A and B) display the estimates of equation (1),
denominated  in local currency and U.S. dollars, respectively.  Tables L.A  and II.A present the
between  estimates,  while Table I.B and Table II.B display  the within estimates.  The tables show
the estimates over different sample periods, using various measures  of deposits. We conduct
estimations  over the following  periods:  June 1993-September  1994, June 1993-March  1995,  and
June 1995-March  1997. Our data set begins in June 1993, when bank level data was made
available  systematically  to the public on a quarterly  basis. Th,e  Mexican  crisis, which triggered a
banking  crisis in Argentina,  started in December 1994. Therefore,  our first estimation  covers the
15pre-crisis period,  June 1993-September  1994. Our second estimation,  for the period June 1993-
March 1995, includes the so-called "tequila crisis". Until then, all deposits were uninsured.
Therefore,  during this period, looking at banks' total term deposits is equivalent  to studying  the
behavior of uninsured deposits.  For each of the sub-categories  discussed  above, we perform  the
estimations  for dollar and peso deposits.
For the period after April 1995, we analyze the behavior of deposits by  size. 6 In
particular,  we estimate  equation (1) separately  for insured and uninsured  deposits. According  to
the deposit insurance  law introduced  in April 1995,  deposits  are protected  up to 20,000 pesos  or
dollars,  depending  on their maturity. 7 Deposits  with a maturity  of more than 90 days are protected
up to 20,000  dollars or pesos.  For deposits with a shorter maturity,  the guarantee  covers deposits
of up to 10,000  pesos  or dollars.  Since  we do not have data on the maturity  of deposits,  there is no
clear way to separate  insured from uninsured  deposits with full certainty.  In order to reduce the
probability  of including uninsured deposits in the insured group, we work with the relatively
conservative  cut off point of 10,000 pesos or dollars. Finally, to analyze the degree of market
discipline  exercised  by "medium"  size and "large" depositors,  we distinguish  between  deposits in
the 20,000-100,000  peso/dollar  range  and those more  than 100,000  pesos/dollars.
[Tables  I.A, I.B, II.A, II.B here]
Table L.A  presents the results for the between estimates for peso deposits. We do not
distinguish  here between the pre-crisis  and crisis periods, since results do not vary significantly
across these periods. The between estimates for peso deposits indicate  that banks with a higher
ratio of non-performing  loans to total loans capture  fewer deposits.  On the other hand, banks  with
a larger proportion  of personal  loans in their portfolio  attract more deposits. In the aftermath  of
the tequila crisis, cash over assets significantly  and positively  explains bank deposits after June
1995, implying that more liquid banks attract more deposits. Table L.A also shows that the
16variable  return  on assets negatively  affects  peso deposits.  The  between  estimates  show that larger
banks (as measured  by the logarithm  of assets) attract  more local currency  deposits.
The between  estimates  for dollar deposits,  displayed  in Table II.A, are similar  to the ones
obtained  for peso deposits.  One difference  is that, in the pre-deposit  insurance  period,  the variable
bonds over assets is negative.  During the tequila crisis, the value of Latin American  government
bonds declined substantially,  and the banks that were heavily invested in these bonds suffered
considerable  losses. Although a priori we expected the ratio of bonds over assets to have a
positive effect on deposits, with the benefit of hindsight, thle estimated negative sign on this
variable  becomes  easier to interpret.
The within estimates for the pre-deposit insurance sample --June 1993 through March
1995-- indicate that bonds over assets is negative and significant in the equations for peso
deposits.  Bank size is significant  and positive in the equations  for both peso and dollar deposits
(see Tables  I.B and II.B). Cash  over assets is statistically  significant  and positive  in the equations
for dollar deposits. Thus, liquid banks attract more deposits. On the other hand, we find that
banks with higher capitalization  rates and a smaller fraction of non-performing  loans capture
fewer dollar deposits  throughout  the period June 1993-March  1  995.
These two last results are the opposite  of what we would have expected. However,  we
can offer an intuitive explanation for these unintuitive results. Between December 1994 and
March 1995, many banks in trouble were merged or acquired.8  Because the acquiring bank
absorbs  the deposits,  the bad loans, the capital, and the assets of the bank in trouble, we observe
an increase in deposits for the acquiring bank, together wilh an increase in its ratio of non-
performing loans and a  fall  in its  capitalization ratio. Thlis fact accounts for the positive
coefficient  on the ratio of non-performing  loans and the negative estimate for the capital assets
ratio during the period June 1993-March  1995. In both cases, if we take from the sample the
acquiring banks, these odd results disappear.9  Finally, note that if we exclude the crisis period
17(when most mergers  and acquisitions took  place),  the results  for  June 1993-September  1994,
show that the variable non-performing  loans has the  expected negative sign, while the capital
assets ratio is negative but insignificant.
With  respect  to  the  macroeconomic  variables,  stock market  prices  and  central  bank
reserves have a positive and significant effect on both pesos and dollar deposits. The interest rate
differential is statistically significant in the equations for dollar deposits before June 1995. This
variable  captures  the  expectations  of a  devaluation.  Our results  indicate  that  dollar  deposits
increase, as the expectations  of a  devaluation grow. The macroeconomic variables  are jointly
significant during the crisis period in the equations for peso and dollar deposits.
The systemic variable is statistically significant and has the expected sign in the equation
that includes the crisis period. As mentioned before, there are two possible interpretations to this
result.  One potential  explanation  is that  individual  bank  deposits exhibit  a  trend  that  is  not
captured by the macroeconomic variables included  in the estimations. Cash to  system deposits
may be significant because it is capturing this trend. The other possible interpretation is that (to
the extent that the macroeconomic variables control for trend developments in the economy) the
negative impact of the systemic variable may be due to contagion. This refers to a situation where
the decisions of individual depositors of a given bank are affected by the behavior of depositors in
other banks.  The fact that the  variable turns  significant  when we  include the  crisis period  is
consistent with the results obtained by D'Amato  et  al. (1997), who find evidence of contagion
during the tequila crisis.
The  within estimates  for the  deposit  insurance period  --the period  after April  1995--
indicate  that,  among  the bank  fundamentals,  the  ratio  of non-perforning  loans to total  loans
almost always has a negative impact on both dollar and peso deposits (see Tables I.B and lI.B).
The ratio of capital over assets is also significant in some specifications. Its effect on deposits is
always positive. The variable bonds over assets is statistically significant and positive (as opposed
18to its negative  effect during  the crisis period) in particular  for small and medium deposits.  Bank
size has a positive  significant  impact  on all peso and dollar  deposits,  except for large deposits.
Regarding the macroeconomic  variables, the last four columns of Table I.B and Table
II.B show that the ratio of central bank reserves to M2 is positive and significant  only among
dollar deposits.  The peso-dollar  interest rate differential  is statistically  significant  and negative in
the equations  for peso deposits.  This variable  is also significant,  but positive,  in the equations  for
dollar deposits.  Under uncover  interest parity, the peso-dollar interest rate differential  measures
the expected  devaluation.  The results show that a higher expected devaluation  decreases  peso
deposits and, at the same time, it raises dollar deposits. Regarding the systemic  variable, the
tables show that cash outside  banks over system deposits is statistically  significant  in thewithin
equation  for dollar deposits,  except in the equation  for large deposits.
The overall results for Argentina  show that we are able to reject the null hypothesis  that
bank  risk characteristics are jointly  insignificant. The F-tests for  bank fundamentals are
significant in all equations for peso and dollar deposits. To test the joint significance  of the
macroeconomic  variables,  we compute and report  the corresponding  F-test statistics.  We are able
to reject the hypothesis  that macroeconomic  variables are  jointly insignificant  across  the different
specifications.  We can also reject  the hypothesis  that the fixed effects are  jointly insignificant  in
all specifications.  In general,  we can reject the null hypothesis  that we should estimate  a random
effects  model.
In summary,  for Argentina,  we find that bank fundamentals  significantly  explain peso
and dollar deposits.  In fact, bank fundamentals  are jointly significant  in all equations.  Therefore,
one can conclude  that there exists market discipline  in the Argentine  banking  system. Given the
individual  significance  of the variables  and the sign of the coefficients,  the evidence  suggests  that
market discipline  is more present in the aftermath  of the crisis. As expected,  there is evidence of
market discipline among uninsured depositors.  However, more surprisingly,  we also find that
19market discipline operates  among insured depositors.  This finding  insinuates that depositors do
not fully rely or believe in the insurance scheme.
The within estimates also show that the systemic variable is statistically significant in the
pre-deposit  insurance  system  period  and,  to  some  degree,  among  small  and  medium  dollar
deposits in general. This result may  signal the presence of contagion. That is, these depositors
appear to  react not only  to the observed risk-taking  of their individual  banks, but also to the
generalized behavior of deposits in other banks in the industry.
Chile:
The results for Chile are shown in Table III and Table IV. Table III reports the estimnates
for total deposits (expressed in pesos) in the l980s  and for peso deposits during the 1990s. Table
IV exhibits the estimates for dollar deposits during the 1990s. For the 1980s, we conducted only
one estimation, because there is no separate information on peso and dollar deposits. Moreover,
there  is no  data on  different  deposit  sizes. Even  if  we had  more  information,  the  distinction
between insured and uninsured deposits was not very clear during the 1980s. In principle, prior to
November  1986 (when our  1980s sample ends), Chile had a limited deposit insurance scheme 1'
However, throughout this  period, several banks were intervened, and  in practice most deposits
were de facto fully insured.
Tables  III  and  IV  display different  estimations  in local  and  foreign  currency for  the
1990s.  Given that  we  have  information  on  the  size of deposits,  we  divide  the  estimation  in
"small,"  "medium,"  and  "large"  deposits.  Small deposits are the  ones  smaller than  120 UFs,
which are also insured."  Medium deposits are defined as those between 120 UFs and 1,500 UFs.
Large deposits are those above 1,500 UFs. We also estimate an equation for uninsured deposits,
namely all deposits above 120 UFs. For deposits in U.S. dollars we divide the sample in "small"
(less than 2,000 dollars), "medium"  (between 2,000 and 30,000 dollars), and "large"  (more than
30,000 dollars).
20[Table III here]
The estimates for the 1980s, displayed in the second column of Table III, show that bank
fundamentals are significant in explaining the behavior of total deposits throughout this period.
The proportion of liquid assets over total assets, the ratio of financial investments to total assets,
and  bank  assets  positively  affect  bank  deposits  at  I  percent.  Administrative  expenditures
negatively affect bank deposits.
The macroeconomic variables  are also  statistically significant in the  1980s estimation.
The  stock market index  positively  affects  bank  deposits, while  central  bank  reserves  have  a
negative  impact.  The  latter result  is hard  to  interpret  since we  expect higher  reserves  to  be
associated with a lower probability of devaluation, which in turn should have a positive effect on
deposits. However, after the peso was devalued in 1982, Chilean reserves as a proportion of M2
recovered. The banking sector, in the meantime, continued to lose deposits, which only bounced
back up after the end of 1984. As a result, following the 1982 devaluation, deposits and reserves
seem to have been negatively correlated. Thus, the negative sign on reserves in the estimation for
the 1980s could be driven by events in Chile following the 1982 devaluation.
During the  1990s, the within estimates across all peso equations suggest that bank risk
characteristics are always relevant in explaining Chilean peso deposits. Table III shows that the
capital assets ratio, the cash to assets ratio, and bank assets have a positive  effect on bank peso
deposits. The variable return on assets is positively associated with deposits, particularly  small
and medium deposits. The F-tests for the joint insignificance ol bank fundamentals can always be
rejected at 1 percent significance level.
With respect to the systemic variable, the proportion of cash outside banks over system
deposits has a negative impact on peso deposits during the 1990s. In other words, when there is a
generalized shift of deposits towards currency outside of the banking sector, the average bank is
negatively  affected  even  after  controlling  for  fundamentals.  This  variable  is  statistically
21significant  at I or at 10 percent level in all specifications  for peso deposits. On the other hand,
macroeconomic  variables do not appear to be very relevant in the equations  for peso deposits.
Only international  reserves in the central bank are statistically  significant  for small and medium
deposits. For  uninsured  and large  deposits,  the macroeconomic  variables  are  jointly insignificant.
Summarizing,  small, medium, and large peso deposits in Chile do not behave very
differently  from each other during  the 1990s.  Even  the results for the 1980s  do not vary radically.
When comparing insured with uninsured deposits in the 1990s,  many of the same variables
appear to  be significant in the regressions. This evidence suggests that even small, insured
depositors impose some degree of market discipline  on the banking sector. Assuming  that the
models are well specified, the behavior of small deposits suggests that the deposit insurance
scheme does not undermine  market discipline.  As in the case of Argentina,  the evidence  suggests
that depositors  either do not fully trust the deposit insurance  scheme  or perceive  that recovering
insured deposits would be a costly process. In addition, as in the case of Argentina, our results
show that peso deposits in Chile respond to the systemic variable, after controlling  for bank
fundamentals.  In  other words, once again, the results are consistent with the presence of
contagion.
Dollar  deposits in Chile behave  differently  than peso deposits.  Dollar  deposits  represent  a
small proportion  of total deposit in Chile. For instance, in 1995, dollar deposits accounted  for
only 5 percent of total deposits. Furthermore, dollar deposits are typically used for dififerent
purposes  than peso deposits,  generally  associated  with transactions  in foreign  currency.  Table IV
displays the within estimates for small, medium, and large dollar deposits. Among the bank
fundamentals,  the results show that, at 5 percent significance  level, the variable investment  over
assets is significant in all dollar regressions. A higher proportion of expenditures  to  assets
negatively  affects small and medium  dollar deposits. In the equation  for medium deposits,  returns
on assets significantly  and positively  explain dollar deposits.  Among large deposits,  an increase
22in cash over assets  has a negative  effect on dollar  deposits. A possible  explanation  for this sign is
that illiquid banks might seek funds from large depositors,  who are able to finance them. In all
equations,  bank assets significantly  and positively explain dolllar  deposits. The F-tests show that
bank fundamentals  are  jointly significant  in all regressions  for dollar  deposits.
[Table  IV here]
In the equations  for small and medium  deposits,  the variable  cash over system deposits  is
statistically  significant  and positive. This seems to suggest  that depositors  allocate their portfolio
between  peso deposits,  on the one hand,  and cash and dollar  deposits,  on the other hand. Thus,  the
ratio of cash outside  banks  to system deposits increases  along with an increase  in dollar deposits.
Among  the macroeconomic  variables,  the interest rate differential is significant  and positive for
all deposit  sizes. A higher probability  of depreciation  increases  dollar deposits,  as we found in the
case of Argentina.  In the equation  for large deposits, central  bank reserves  have a positive  effect
on dollar deposits.' 2
Mexico:
We conduct  four sets of estimations  of equation  (1). The results are displayed  in Table V.
For the period March 1991  through September  1995,  we only have  information  for the largest 12
Mexican banks, which hold 80 to 90 percent of total deposits.  Approximately  20 banks were in
business  at the beginning  of the sample. First, we study the behavior  of deposits in the 12 banks
during the pre-crisis  period,  March 1991 through September 1994.  Second,  to test the constancy
of parameters  during the Mexican  crisis, we estimate the equation throughout  the period March
1991-September  1995,  using the same  banks.1 3 For the post-crisis  period,  December 1995-March
1998,  we estimate  two equations.  One estimation  includes all available banks in the sample (38
banks). However, since the number of  banks  increases drastically in  1995 --due  to  the
deregulation  of the Mexican banking  sector and the lifting of restrictions  for foreign entry--  we
estimate a second  equation. The latter includes only the 12 banks for which we have data for the
23whole sample. The purpose of this regression is to  compare how deposits in the 12 banks
included  in our pre-crisis  estimations  behave  during  the post-crisis  period.
The data set for Mexico  does not provide  information  regarding  different  size or different
currency  denomination  of deposits.  This lack of information  is not very problematic  in our study
of market discipline  for Mexico,  since due to legal restrictions  almost 100%  of deposits  are held
in pesos, the local currency. Also, the legislation on deposit insurance does not distinguish
between small and large deposits. In principle, 100% of deposits are implicitly guaranteed  in
Mexico.
The Credit Institutions  Law passed in 1990  created  FOBAPROA,  a trust administered  by
the Banco  de Mexico.  According  to this legislation,  this trust was created  to serve as a mechamism
for preventive  support to commercial  banks and to protect savings. The Credit Institutions  Law
does not obligate  FOBAPROA  to explicitly guarantee  or insure any obligations  of commercial
banks. However, Article 122 does provide that each year, in December, FOBAPROA  must
announce  the maximum  amount of the obligations it intends to protect. In general,  FOBAP'ROA
has expressed  an intention  to protect all deposits. However,  it is important  to note that given  that
FOBAPROA  is not an explicit deposit insurance  scheme, depositors  of a Mexican  bank are not
entitled  to make a claim against FOBAPROA  in the event of an uncovered  default by any such
bank.
[Table  V here]
For the pre-crisis  period,  the second column of Table V shows that bank fundamentals
are significant in explaining bank deposits. Capital over assets, consumption  loans over total
loans, cash over assets, and bank assets positively affect bank deposits. On the other hand, the
ratio of non-performing  loans to total loans has a negative effect on bank deposits. All these
variables are statistically  significant at 1 percent. The stock market index and the peso-dollar
interest rate differential  are statistically  significant  only at 10  percent significance  level.
24The equation that extends the sample to include the crisis period also shows that bank
fundamentals  significantly  explain bank deposits. Among them, consumption  loans over total
loans, cash over assets, and bank assets positively affect bank deposits.  In this equation,  central
bank reserves are significant and negative.' 4 As  in the case of Chile during its crisis, the
government  lost reserves but system deposits did not fall. This fact seems to be explaining  the
sign of the variable.
The fourth column in Table V shows the estimates for the same 12 banks during the
aftermath  of the Mexican  crisis. Only the bank fundamentals  significantly  explain  bank deposits.
The proportion  of consumption  loans over total loans and the size of bank assets positively  affect
bank deposits.  On the other hand, return on assets and expenditures  over assets negatively  affect
deposits.
When we include all banks --38 in total-- the results are slightly modified. Among the
bank fundamentals, the  proportion of  non-performing lozms to  total  loans  is  statistically
significant  and negative  at I percent.  On the other  hand, the proportion  of housing  loans  over total
loans and the ratio of bank expenditures  over assets are statistically  significant  and positive.  As
discussed  earlier, we can expect both a negative or positive sign for the ratio of housing loans
over total loans. On the one hand, housing loans typically have collateral,  which guarantees  the
loan. On the other  hand, these loans might be risky since  during a financial  crisis, the value of the
collateral  tends to fall. The variable expenditure  over assets is positive and significant.  Higher
expenditures might reflect higher advertisement and better service to customers, which may
attract more deposits.
The systemic  variable  is statistically  significant  and positive  at 10 percent,  during  the post
crisis period --when both deposits  and cash over system deposits grew. Even though we expect a
negative sign for this variable,  a positive  coefficient suggests  that deposits in the entire banking
sector  grew at a slower  rate than cash outside  banks. Thus,  we find a positive correlation  between
25these two variables.  The rapid growth in cash outside  banks might be a consequence  of increases
in liquidity in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Among the macroeconomic  variables, the
interest rate differential is  statistically significant and negative. In other words, a  hiigher
probability  of devaluation  corresponds  to lower bank  deposits.
The F-tests show that bank fundamental are jointly significant at  1 percent in  all
specifications.  Thus, the results provide evidence of market discipline in Mexico for all the
specifications  studied.  The presence of market discipline in Mexico,  despite the 100% imlplicit
guarantee of deposits, could be due to the murkiness in the Credit Institutions Law. In other
words, though  FOBAPROA  was created  with the intention  of protecting  savings,  the fact that it is
not legally responsible for paying out depositors in cases of bank closures might create an
incentive  for them to monitor  banks.
Finally, the  F-tests show that  systemic and  macroeconomic variables are jointly
significant at a  5 or 10 percent significance level. The systemic variable only appears to be
individually  significant  in the last equation and it enters  with an unexpected  sign. Therefore,  the
evidence  is not consistent  with contagion in the case of Mexico.
VI - What Is the Relative Importance of Market Discipline?
In the previous section,  we showed  that bank fundamentals  significantly  explain deposits
in  Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Several variables are statistically significant in  various
specifications.  Furthermore,  when taken jointly, we are always able to reject the hypothesis  that
bank fundamentals  are statistically insignificant  at 1 percent significance  level. The joint tests
exclude  the variable  bank assets, so our results are not driven  by a bank size effect. Nevertheless,
the previous section did not explore the relative importance  of bank fundamentals  vis-a-viis  the
systemic and macroeconomic  factors. Bank risk-taking can significantly explain deposits at
reasonable  statistical standards,  but its effects may be negligible.  In this section,  we analyze  the
26relative impact of market discipline in all specifications.  We estimate standardized  coefficients
and we calculate  the variance  explained  by each group of variiables  (bank, macro, and systemic)
in order to answer  this question.
Standardized  coefficients  are presented  in Table I through Table V, next to the columns
that report  the coefficients  obtained in the within estimations. 15 Standardized  coefficients  are unit
free coefficients  that we can therefore  compare across regressors.  To estimate  these coefficients,
we subtract  each bank's mean from each variable.  Then, we divide each demeaned  variable  by
each bank's standard  deviation.  Since  the fixed effects are removed,  we obtain the standardized
coefficients  by estimating  pooled regressions. Standardized  coefficients  express by how many
standard  deviations  the dependent  variable increases,  when the independent  variable increases  by
one standard  deviation.
The results from the standardized  coefficients  are quite revealing.  The coefficients  of the
bank fundamentals  increase substantially.  Particularly,  when 'bank  fundamentals  are statistically
significant, the standardized  coefficients are always larger in absolute value, except for the
variable  bank assets. For instance,  the coefficient  on non-performing  loans for large peso  deposits
in Argentina increase  from -0.016 to -0.252. The coefficient  on cash over assets increases  from
0.015 to 0.599 during the 1980s in Chile. The coefficient on consumption  loans to total loans
increases  from 0.086 to 0.517 in Mexico, in the equation for 12 banks during December 1995-
March 1998.  Not only do these coefficients  increase in size, but also they become comparable  in
magnitude  to the coefficients  on the systemic  and macroeconomic  variables.  This proves  that the
relative effect of bank risk-taking  is not negligible.
To  measure the  relative importance of  bank  fundamentals, we  also  compute the
proportion  of the variance  explained  by these variables (excluding  bank assets).1 6 Any variance
decomposition  is problematic  since the different groups  of variables included in a regression  are,
typically, not orthogonal to each other. Therefore, the part of the variance explained by two
27groups  of variables  would be attributed to  the first  group  included in the regression.7 In our
exercise, we first run the regressions with the systemic and macroeconomic variables, as well as
with the variable bank assets. Then, we re-run the regression, including the bank fundamentals.
For each regression, we compute the increase in the  adjusted R-squared, as a proportion of the
total  variance explained  by  all  variables  (except  the  fixed effects).  In other words,  Table  VI
displays the fraction explained by the bank fundamentals as a share of the variance explained by:
bank  risk,  macroeconomic,  and  systemic  variables.  If  the  different  groups  of variables  are
correlated, these  estimations bias downward the variance attributed to bank fundamentals  since
we include them last.
[Table VI here]
The results displayed in Table VI indicate that bank fundamentals explain a significant
proportion of the total variance of deposits,  particularly  in the late periods. For Argentina, the
proportion explained by bank fundamentals varies from 3 percent to a maximum of 75 percent. In
the case of Chile, the proportion jumps  from 11 percent in the 1980s to values between 19 percent
and 38 percent for peso deposits in the 1990s. In Mexico, bank fundamentals explain between 7
and 87 percent of the total variance. The results  show that there  are no systematic differences
across deposit sizes. It is not the case that bank fundamentals explain a higher proportion of the
variance in the equations for large deposits vis-A-vis  the equations for medium and small deposits.
Interestingly,  the  main  difference  across  specifications  is  the  sharp  increase  in  the
variance explained  by  bank fundamentals  after crisis  periods. In the case  of Chile,  the  steep
increase in the variance takes place when comparing the 1980s (when there was a banking crisis)
with the 1990s. Market discipline also seems to be more important in Argentina and Mexico after
the crises than before and during them. For instance, in the case of Mexico, the proportion of the
variance  explained  by  bank fundamentals  in the  12 banks  largest banks  is  21  percent and  7
28percent, before and during the crisis respectively. However, after the crisis this variance increases
to 86 percent for the same group of banks.
The increase in the variance explained by bank fundamentals in Argentina, occurs even
after the deposit insurance scheme was established in the aftermath of the crisis. This evidence
further supports the notion that the deposit insurance does not appear to be credible. We can also
interpret this result as indicating that the introduction of the deposit insurance did not undermine
market discipline.
Our results that the variance explained by fundamentals increases after crises should be
interpreted with caution. It is not completely valid from this result to conclude that there was less
market discipline  before crises.  When comparing  the pre  and post crises  periods, we  are only
looking at  the variance of deposits explained by  fundamentals.  However, as mentioned  at the
beginning of this paper, depositors can impose market discipline by either withdrawing deposits
or by requiring higher interest. It is feasible that before crises, discipline occurred only through
increases in interest rates. If this  is the case,  the fact that  we  are only examining changes  in
deposits will bias our conclusions.
Finally,  to the  extent that  we can make  a cross-country  comparison after the banking
crises,  the  degree  of  market  discipline  via  changes  in  deposit  quantities  seems  to  be  more
important in Argentina and Mexico than in Chile. Perhaps, the longer history of macroeconomic
stability in Chile has made investors less concerned about their deposits.
VII - Are the Findings of Market Discipline Robust?
The results presented above depend on the assumption that bank fundamentals, systemic
variables, and  macroeconomic variables  are exogenously  determined. Although most previous
studies  of  market  discipline  do  not  address  this  issue,  under  certain  circumstances,  the
explanatory variables could be potentially endogenous.
29Endogeneity arises when changes in deposits have an effect on bank fundamentals.
Changes  in deposits at time t probably  affect bank fundamentals  from timet onwards.  Then,  if we
had contemporaneous  bank fundamentals,  our estimates would most likely be biased. In our
specification,  bank fundamentals  are lagged one quarter,  to account for the fact that information
becomes  available  with a delay. This fact solves part of the problem.  Nevertheless,  endogeneity
might still be present.  If bankers  are forward  looking,  they will anticipate  that bank fundamentals
at time t-I affect deposits at time t. Therefore,  banks might try to adjust  their risk characteristics,
to prevent  future  deposit  withdrawals.
In other to account for endogeneity,  we adopt GMM methods.' 8 This methodology  first-
differences  equation (1), so bank-specific  effects are eliminated.  First-differencing  equation (1)
yields equation  (2):
(DEPi-,  - DEP,_3J)  = 6'(SYS,  - SYS,-,)  +  7'(MCRO,  - MACRO,Q,)  + f'(BANK,1, - BAK,,-2)+  (V;,  - "I-Il-]
We relax the assumption  that bank fundamentals  are strictly exogenous  --that they are
uncorrelated  with the error term at all leads and lags. Instead,  we assume  that bank fundamentals
are weakly exogenous  --that they are uncorrelated  with realizations of the error term from time
t+1 onwards.  We believe  that it is safe to assume  that systemic  and macroeconomic  variables are
exogenously  determined,  namely  they do not react to bank individual  deposits.
We use the system estimator  proposed  by Arellano and Bover (1995) to obtain estimates
of 9, y, and ,.  This estimator  combines  the regression  in first differences  in equation (2) and the
regression in levels in equation (1).  Blundell and Bond  (1997) show that the system  estimLator
reduces the potential  biases and imprecision  of using only the equation in first differences as in
Anderson  and Hsiao  (1982)  and Arellano  and Bond (1991).
Under the assumption of  weak exogeneity of bank fundamentals, we need to  use
instruments to  account for the fact that some of the variables in BANKi,,.  may be jointly
30determined  with DEPj,,.  The instruments  for the regression  in clifferences  are lagged  levels of the
corresponding  variable.  The instruments  for the regression  in levels are lagged differences  of the
corresponding  variable.
Assuming  that the error term vj,,  is not serially correlated and that BANKP,,]  is weakly
exogenous,  we obtain the following  moment  conditions  for the regression  in differences:
E [SYS  ,, x  (v,,, - vt  I,)]  = O,
E[MACRO  x (v;, -v;,,)=  0,  fors23;t  -4,...,T.  (3)
E[BANK  t-s  x(  - v,,  ,)]= 0,
Under the assumption that any correlation between the bank specific effects and the
levels of the explanatory  variables is constant over time, the differences  of the right-hand  side
variables and the bank specific effects would be uncorrelated.  When this is the case, lagged
differences  are valid instruments  for the equation in levels. Then, the moment conditions  for the
regression  in levels  are:
E[(SYS,  - SYSi,," )x (pI + vi,)] = 0,
E[(MACRO,, - AM4CRO,.,,  )x(u,  + v,]=  0,  (4)
E[(BANKj,,  - BANK j, 2)x (a,  + vj,)]=  (.
The system estimated  in the Arellano and Bover (1995)  technique  consists  of the stacked
regressions  in differences  and levels. The moment conditions  in (3) are used for the first part of
the system, that is, the regressions  in differences.  The moment conditions  in (4) are used for the
second part of the system, that is, the regressions  in levels. The model is estimated  in two steps.
The first step assumes  that v,j are independent  and homoskedlastic  across individuals  and over
time. The residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct  a consistent estimate of the
variance-covariance  matrix of the moment conditions  in the second step. Efficiency  is gained in
the second  step estimates.
In general,  panels used in econometric  estimations  have a large number  of cross-sectional
units and a small number of time periods. Our data set contains  a limited number of individuals.
31Then, in order to work  with a manageable  number of moment  restrictions,  the moment conditions
are applied such that each of them corresponds to all available periods. In other words, the
number  of moment  restrictions  is constant  across  observations.
We compute  two specification  tests to check whether  the assumptions  made to calculate
the GMM  estimators  are valid. First, we calculate  the Sargan test of over-identifying  restrictions.
The null hypothesis  of the Sargan  test is that lagged values  of the explanatory  variables  are valid
instruments. The model is well specified whenever we fail to reject the test. The second test
estimates whether the error term is not serially correlated. We use the error term from the
equation in first differences.  The error term has first-order serial correlation  by construction.
Therefore,  we test whether the first-differenced  error term has second-order  serial correlation.
Once again, failure to reject confirms that the model's assumption  of no serial correlation  (in
levels)  is valid.
Table VII reports the GMM estimates  for Argentina. 19 Table VIII displays  the results for
Chile and  Mexico. Given that the  number of  instruments is  greater than the number of
individuals,  GMM estimates  cannot  be computed  for the specifications  that involve 12 Mexican
banks. The results show that we are not able to reject the Sargan test in any of the specifications.
Moreover,  we are not able to reject  the null hypothesis  of no second-order  serial correlation  of the
residuals. In other words, the Sargan test and the autocorrelation  test indicate that the C,MM
models  are well specified.
[Tables  VII and VIII  here]
The GMM estimations  suggest that bank fundamentals  are still statistically significant,
once we account for their potential  endogeneity.  Most of the variables  that appeared  statistiically
significant in the OLS estimations remain significant  when we apply GMM, although some
specific differences  appear  in the point estimates.  Regarding  the  joint tests for bank fundamentals,
we find again that there is evidence  of market discipline  across equations. We cannot reject the
32tests that bank fundamentals  are  jointly significant  even  when we exclude  the logarithm  of assets.
Given that we consistently find that bank fundamentals  continue to be significant,  the GMM
estimations  suggest  that our previous  results are robust to potenltial  endogeneity  problems.
VIII -Conclusions
This paper conducted a study of depositor market discipline  in the Argentine, Chilean,
and Mexican banking sectors during the 1980s and 1990s.  The purpose of this study was to
examine  whether  depositors  punish risky banks by withdrawing  their deposits.  In order to analyze
this question,  we used bank level data to estimate  reduced  form equations,  in which bank deposits
were modeled  as a function  of bank specific, systemic,  and macroeconomic  variables.
The data set used in this paper enabled us to study market discipline under different
circumstances  and among different groups  of depositors.  First, the data available allowed us to
test in detail the presence  of market discipline  during the Chilean  financial  crisis of the 1980s,  as
well as during the Argentine and Mexican financial crises of  1994-95. These episodes are
attractive because they permitted us to study whether the extent of market discipline  changed
after the financial crises. We were also able to test whether banking  crises were preceded by a
lack of market discipline, and if so, whether banking crises were learning experiences for
depositors.
Second,  we were also able to study market discipline  in situations  where regulations  on
the countries' banking  sectors changed.  For example, in the case of Argentina,  we were able to
compare  the results for the pre-deposit  insurance  period withl  those for the period after deposit
insurance  was introduced.  For the latter period, we distinguished  between  insured and uninsured
depositors. Also, we compared the results for medium size depositors with those for large
depositors.  In the case of Chile, deposits were implicitly  guairanteed  during the 1980s,  while a
limited deposit insurance scheme  was in place during the 1990s.  For the latter period,  we were
33able to compare the behavior of insured versus uninsured deposits, as well as the behavior of
medium and large peso and dollar deposits. In the case of Mexico,  since the available data is
aggregate  and the deposit insurance  regulation  (covering 100%  of deposits) did not change, we
were not capable  of making  similar distinctions.
Our results helped us to conclude  that depositors  in Argentina,  Chile, and Mexico  pumish
banks for risky behavior. The tests for the joint insignificance of bank fundamentals were
consistently rejected across equations. In other words, we were unable to  accept the null
hypothesis that the bank risk variables are not relevant in explaining the behavior of bank
deposits.  This finding  was consistently  verified in the between,  within,  and GMM  estimations.
We found evidence of market discipline whether we examined deposits in  local or
foreign currency.  Also, we could not reject the null hypothesis  that insured, uninsured,  medium,
and large deposits respond to bank risk-taking. Even though large depositors have a  larger
amount of funds at risk, their deposits  probably represent  a smaller proportion  of their wealth. 20
Therefore,  we are not surprised  by the result  that small and large  depositors  discipline  banks.
The finding that even insured depositors exercise market discipline can be due to  a
number of reasons.  One possible explanation  is a lack of credibility in the insurance  schemes.  If
depositors  believe  that in the event of a crisis their deposits  will not be covered,  then they have
large incentives  to closely monitor  banks to avoid losing their funds. Alternatively,  it is possible
that we observe discipline by insured depositors because, even if the insurance is credible,
depositors  want to avoid any costs they might face (typically  in the form of delays)  when banks
fail. Repayments  through the insurance fund usually take time. Moreover, when a bank fails,
there are efforts  to sell the failing bank to other institutions,  in order to minimize the cost for the
insurance  fund. One of the major incentives  for a healthy bank to buy a failing bank is to acquire
the failed bank's deposits.  Therefore,  if deposits are returned through the deposit insurance,  the
value of the failing bank decreases.  As a consequence,  both insured and uninsured  deposits are
34only returned  once the acquisition  process  is complete.  Recent experiences  with failing banks in
the countries we analyze have validated depositors' concerns about insufficient  funds in the
deposit  insurance  schemes  and about long delays  in repayments.
The  standardized coefficients and  the  analysis  of  variance showed  that  bank
fundamentals  are not only jointly and individually  significant,  but also they seem  to be important
vis-a-vis systemic and macroeconomic  factors. The analysis of variance suggested  that banking
crises seem to be "wake-up" calls for depositors.  The degree of market discipline  becomes  more
important  after banking  crises. On the other hand, before and during crises, the extent of market
discipline  is much more limited.
Prima facie, the results obtained in this paper provide evidence in favor of regulatory
efforts to increase the reliance on market discipline to control bank risk-taking.  However,  there
are a number  of caveats and extensions  to the results in this paper. First, our conclusions  on the
degree  of market discipline  should  be considered  as partial.  As mentioned  at the beginning  of the
paper,  depositors  can impose  market discipline  on banks by requiring  higher interest  rates and/or
withdrawing  their deposits. In this paper, we have focused on the response of the quantity of
deposits to changes in bank risk characteristics.  The fact that we find that riskier banks attract
fewer deposits provides evidence of market discipline.  Nevertheless,  a complete assessment  of
the full extent of market discipline  would require an analysis  of the behavior  of both prices and
quantities,  which cannot  be performed  given  the lack of adequaite  data on interest  rates
Second, to strongly support market vis-A-vis  regulatory discipline, it is not enough to
show that depositors  respond  to bank risk-taking.  It is also important  to determine,  in turn, that
bankers  respond  to depositors'  behavior  by reducing  the amounit  of risk they take. This question  is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Third, the finding that even once we control for bank risk-taking there appears to be
evidence of contagion, indicates that it would be  a mistake to  rely exclusively on market
35discipline  to  constrain  bank's  exposures  to  risk.  In  this  circumstance,  adequate  prudential
regulation and supervision remain extremely important. The evidence on contagion indicates that
some depositors'  decision to withdraw their funds is affected not only by the risk taken by  their
own banks, but also it is a function  of other depositors'  actions.  In the presence of contagion,
market discipline may be inefficient, since depositors,  influenced by the evolution of deposiits in
the  banking  system,  may  withdraw  deposits  from  healthy  banks.  Increasing  disclosure  of
information  and transparency  in the  banking  sector might  help  to  avoid this  type  of herding
behavior. Also, enhancing the credibility of the existing deposit safety net may reduce contagion
among insured depositors, and therefore avoid runs on good banks.
Finally,  in  this  paper  we  have  not  identified  the  specific  channels  through  which
depositors  obtain  information  regarding  banks  fundamentals.  Depositors  may  be  getting  the
information directly  from balance  sheets, from financial advisors,  newspaper articles,  or from
rumors. Future research on this subject could shed light on how the banking sector operates and
on what mechanisms may promote efficient market discipline, i.e. the kind where depositors can
always distinguish "good" from "bad" banks.
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40Enduotes
Some  measures  of risk frequently  used include:  proportion  of non-performing  loans to total  loans, loan loss
provisions,  capital assets  ratio,  ratio of real estate  loans  to total loans,  return on assets,  and variance  of stock
returns.
2 A related literature  exists on the causes of bank failures in developing  countries  and on how to resolve
banking crises. See, among others, Gonzalez-Hermosillo,  Pazarbasioglu,  and Billings (1996), Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache  (1997), Caprio and Klingebiel  (1996), Rojas-Suarez  (1997), and Rojas-Suarez  and
Weisbrod  (1996).
Interest rates in her study are implicit rates (i.e. interest rate expenditure  over total deposits)  and not
explicit  market  rates paid by banks.
4 Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani  (1998) are among  the only  studies  that examine  the effect of bank risk
taking  on both  interest  rates and deposits.
5 We are grateful  to Alejandra  Anastasi,  Laura D'Amato,  Angel del Canto, Gina Casar,  Claudio  Chamorro,
Leonardo  Hemandez,  Victor Manuel  Lopez,  Andrea Molinari,  and Agustin  Villar  for comments  and help in
understanding  the data.
6Data  on deposits  by size is not available  before early 1995.
7In  September  1998,  the insurance  coverage  was extended  to deposits  of all maturities  up to 30,000  pesos or
dollars.  However,  since  our data ends in March 1997,  this recent  change  does  not affect  our analysis.
8 In our estimations,  anytime  a bank acquires  another  bank (whose  assets are considerably  large  relative  to
those of the acquiring  bank) we treat  the acquiring  bank as a new bank in the sample.
9  The results  from  this exercise  are not reported  here, but are available  upon request.
° This deposit  insurance  scheme  first introduced  in January 1977  and expanded  in December  1981  protected
deposits  up to 3,500  dollars.
1 UFs are "unidades  de fomento"  or units of account,  equal  to around  4,000  dollars  in 1997.
12 For dollar  deposits  we only  compute  equations  for small,  medium,  and large  deposits.  We do not compare
"insured" versus "uninsured"  deposits because  the threshold  for insured deposits  (120 UFs) changes over
time whenever  the peso dollar  exchange  rate  moves.
4113 Given  the restricted  number  of observations,  we do not estimate  a separate  equation  for the crisis  period.
4 This  is similar  to what we found in Chile  during  its banking  crisis.
15 T-statistics  for standardized  coefficients are not reported  to make the tables more readable.  Hovvever,
standardized  coefficients  are statistically  significant  whenever  the regular  coefficients  are also  significant.
16 Another  alternative  to study the relative importance  of each group of variables  would  be to use the first
principal  component  of each group. Then, one could compare  the size of the coefficients  for each principal
component.  Unfortunately,  the frst  principal  component  of bank fundamentals  comprises  a low proportion
of their total variance.  Then, to capture bank fundamentals,  we would  need to use more than one principal
component.  This  would  make  our comparison  less  straightforward.
'' This  problem  still  persists  when  a Cholesky  decomposition  is used.
Is Arellano  and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), among others have developed  the GMM
methodology  for panel data. For empirical  applications  of the technique see Caselli, Esquivel,  and Lefort
(1996), Easterly,  Loayza, and Montiel (1997), Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel,  and Serven (1998). We thank
Thorsten Beck, Norman Loayza, and George Monokroussos  for their help  in implementing  the DPD
econometric  software.
'9 Since we want to check whether the evidence of market discipline is robust to the assumption of
endogeneity,  we only  report the results for those periods  where  the within  estimators  indicated  the presence
of market discipline.  Consequently,  for Argentina,  we do not present  results for the pre-crisis  period since
we found  little  evidence  of discipline  in the within  estimations.
20 Furthermore,  large investors  more likely  diversify  by holding  bonds and equity.
42Table I.A: Argentina  -Panel Estimates  for Real Peso Deposits
Jun.  93 -Mar.  95  Jun.  1995 - Mar. 1997
< $10,000  > $20,000  >$20,000  &  > $100,000
<$100,000
Variables  Between  Between  Between  Between  Between
Lag(Capital/Assets)  -0.019  0.004  0.012  0.001  0.008
(-1.20)  (0.20)  (0.93)  (0.04)  (0.84)
Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.020 *  0.013  -0.021 *  -0.007  -0.024
(-3.45)  (1.11)  (-2.57)  (-0.73)  (-3.95)
Lag(Real  Estate  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.006  -0.008  -0.011  -0.006  -0.025
(-0.81)  (-0.67)  (-1.43)  (-0.64)  (-3.44)
Lag(Personal Loans/Total Loans)  0.008  0.014 *  0.013  **  0.019 ***  0.004
(1.36)  (2.65)  (2.10)  (3.28)  (0.87)
Lag(Return/Assets)  -0.080 *  -0.097  ***  -0.076 *  -0.100 **  -0.042
(-1.81)  (-3.03)  (-1.65)  (-2.44)  (-1.88)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.013  0.134 **'  0.106  ***  0.150 ***  0.030
(0.71)  (2.56)  (2.69)  (4.13)  (1.17)
Lag(Bonds/Assets)  -0.010  -0.016  0.007  0.003  0.003
(-0.53)  (-0.43)  (0.25)  (0.12)  (0.16)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  0.366  *  *  *  0.227 **  0.010  0.055  -0.005
(3.25)  (2.28)  (0.10)  (0.60)  (-0.10)
Lag( Log of(Assets/CPI))  0.967 ***  1.083 **"  1.090 *  0.873 ***  1.076
(11.01)  (9.98)  (13.91)  (10.27)  (16.49)
C  -2.763 ***  -7.177 **'  -4-373 *  -5.199  ***  -3.422
(-2.92)  (-5.85)  (-4.09)  (-4.68)  (-5.78)
Adjusted  R-sq  d  . - ...... 0.7..........................  ......  13  0.732  0.764  0.698  0.853
Number of banks  162  90  91  87  82
T-statistics  are in parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White correction  for heteroskedasticity.
*,  **, ***  indicate  10,  5, 1 percent  level  of significance,  respectively.Table l.B: Argentina  -Panel Estimates for Real Peso Deposits
Jun.  93 - Sept.94  Jun. 93 - Mar. 95  Jun. 1995 - Mar.  1997 ..........................................................................  ........  ..  ...............................................  ....................  ..............  ................................... I.... ....  ..  .... .....I........  ............ <$  10,000  >52020,0  00  0,0  <1000>$I0,0
Variables  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients
Cash Outside  0.007  0.045  -0.024 i  -0.094  -0.008  -0.038  -0.007  -0.025  -0.017  -0.081  0.007  0.026
Banks/System  Deposits  (0.42)  (-2.44)  (-0.60)  (0.40)  (-1.23)  (0.37)
Stock Market Index in  0.547 *  0.169  0.636 **  0.201  -0.240  -0.097  0.092  0.028  0.001  0.001  0.231  0.076
Dollars  (2.50)  (2.55)  (-0.78)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.50)
Central Bank  -0.023  -0.111  0.041 ***  0.278  0.003  0.013  -0.024  -0.084  -0.002  -0.009  -0.039  -0.141
Reserves/M2  (-0.92)  (3.22)  (0.13)  (-0.86)  (-0.09)  (-1.21)
Peso-Dollarlnterest  -0.005  -0.013  -0.010  -0.046  -0.098 *+  -0.233  -0.105 *+  -0.184  -0.112 ***  -0.254  -0.096 ***  -0.173
Rate Differential  (-0.27)  (-0.48)  (-5.14)  (-3.  70)  (-5.45)  (-3.28)
Lag(Capilal/Asscts)  -0.005  -0.039  -0.010  -0.059  0.023  *  0.254  0.022  0).179  0).030  +  0.304  0.014  0.119
(-0.71)  (-1.19)  (1.68)  (1.09)  (1.89)  (0,81)
Lag(Non-performing  -0.002  -0.018  0.007  0.057  -0.009 *  -0.172  -0.017 ***  -0.248  -0.011 *  -0.207  -0.016 t  -0.252
Loans/Total  Loans)  (-0.38)  (1.55)  (-1.93)  (-3.40)  (-2.37)  (-2.96)
Lag(Real Estate  -0.005  -0.038  -0.001  -0.005  -0.005  -0.057  -0.003  -0.024  -0.003  -0.038  -0.004  -0.043
Loans/Total  Loans)  (-0.97)  (-0.13)  (-1.55)  (-0.62)  (-0.69)  (-0.87)
Lag(Personal  0.001  0.012  -0.002  -0.018  -0.001  -0.013  -0.010  -0.079  -0.003  -0.031  -0.013 4  -0.118
Loans/Total  Loans)  (0.41)  (-0.62)  (-0.42)  (-1.44)  (-0.69)  (-1.70)
Lag(Return/Assets)  -0.003  -0.050  -0.008 **  -0.104  0.008  0.107  0.009  0.091  0.005  0.072  0.001  0.008
(-1.12)  (-2.54)  (0.72)  (0.78)  (0.52)  (0.17)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  -0.003  -0.027  -0.005  -0.034  0.005  0.039  0.005  0.026  0.012  0.082  -0.001  -0.005
(-0.82)  (-1.28)  (0.98)  (0.52)  (1.62)  (0.08)
Lag(Bonds/Assets)  -0.016 *  -0.099  -0.002  -0.010  0.015 ***  0.168  0.005  0.04  0.004  0.040  0.012  0.111
(-L.75)  (-0.27)  (3.41)  (0.74)  (0.77)  (1.63)
Lag(Expenditure/  0.041  0.049  0.035  0.046  0.008  0.034  0.004  0.011  0.001  0.003  0.020  0.056
Assets)  (1.02)  (1,58)  (0.63)  (0.17)  (0.04)  (1.04)
Lag( Log of  0.610 *  0.262  0.554 i+*  0.187  0.521 *  0.299  0.571 *  0.249  0.508  0.287  0.451  0.208
(Assets/CPI))  (2.57)  (2.64)  (1.66)  (1.78)  (1.84)  (1.51)
Adjusted R s.uared  0.959  0.929  0 974.0.953.0964.0947
F- Fixed Effects  34.439 +  26.480  ***  56.056 ***  22.584 ***  39.179 +**  13.427 ***
F- Macro Variables  5.727  **  65.619 **  6.706  *  5.234 ***  9.802 *  4.752 ***
F-Bank Fundamentals  1.503  3.172 +  6.473 t"  5.113 +  5.852  i  4.691  i  *
F-(Macro+System)  4.734 *5*  50.976 *  5.065 i  4.422 +  8.193 +  3.768  **
Chi-Hausman  6.192  49.504 +  3.290  *  78.781 *5*  40.329  +  54.064  **
Number of banks  158  162  90  91  87  82
Number of observations  .791  1120  507  511  491  465
T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White  correction for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate 10,5,  I percent level of significance,  respectively.Table Il.A:  Argentina - Panel Estimates for Dollar Deposits
Dec 93-Mar 95  Jun. 1995- Mar. 1997
.. <  0$...................  .0,000  .......  >US$20,000  >US$0,00
<US$100,000
Variables  Between  Between  Between  Between  Between
Lag(Capital/Assets)  -0.014  0.011  0.009  0.024  0.005
(-1.52)  (0.58)  (0.75)  (1.61)  (0.47)
Lag(Non-performing Loans/Total Loans)  -0.043 ***  -0.009  -0.027  ***  -0.018 **  -0.027
(-7.66)  (-0.72)  (-3.56)  (-2.35)  (-4.70)
Lag(Real Estate Loans/Total Loans)  0.002  -0.005  -0.003  -0.002  -0.005
(0.45)  (-0.51)  (-0.65)  (-0.26)  (-0.85)
Lag(Personal Loans/Total Loans)  -0.004  0.009  0.002  0.006  0.001
(-0.89)  (1.40)  (0.37)  (0.87)  (0.31)
Lag(Retum/Assets)  -0.034  -0.191 ***  -0.118 ***  -0.168  ***  -0.069
(-1.18)  (-5.21)  (-3.79)  (-4.01)  (-2.23)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.017  0.177 ***  0.142 ***  0.175  ***  0.102
(1.55)  (3.35)  (3.78)  (3.82)  (3.36)
Lag(Bonds/Assets)  -0.038 **  -0.010  0.011  0.005  -0.004
(-2.33)  (-0.29)  (0.56)  (0.18)  (-0.19)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  0.112  0.240 **  -0.037  0.049  -0.099
(1.56)  (2.11)  (-0.47)  (0.49)  (-1.70)
Lag( Log of Assets in Dollars)  0.964 ***  1.123 ***  0.948 ***  0.976  ***  0.949
(18.02)  (11.31)  (15.31)  (12.04)  (16.31)
C  -0.748  -6.978  ***  -2.343 **  -4.576 ***  -2.138
(-0.90)  (-4.32)  (-2.22)  (-3.41)  (-2.33)
. . . . . . . ..  ........................  .....................  .........  ..............................  9..............
Adjusted R-squared  0.866  0.752  0.795  0.755  0.842
Number of banks  162  90  91  87  82
T-statistics  are in parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White coffection  for heteroskedasticity.
*, **,  *** indicate  10,  5, 1  percent level  of significance,  respectively.Table II.B: Argentina - Panel Estimates for Dollar Deposits
Jun.  93 - Sept. 94  Jun.93  - Mar.95  Jun.  1995 - Mar.  1997
<..S$.  0,000  >  ,  ,,,  ,,  ...................  US$20,000  . . <  j  .. .................  US$100,0
Variables  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Withil  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients
Cash Outside  0.002  0.017  -0.012 *  -0.089  -0.035 *  -0.175  -0.028 **  -0.14  -0.035 **  -0.183  -0.022  -0.108
Banks/System  Deposits  (0.13)  (-2.26)  (-3.15)  (-2.14)  (-2.94)  (-1.47)
Stock Market Index  in  0.434  *  0.223  0.560  +  0.321  -0.381  -0.165  0.064  0.28  0.165  0.074  0.290  0.125
Dollars  (2.71)  (3.30)  (-1.43)  (0.23)  (0.61)  (0.96)
Central Bank  -0.028  -0.212  0.023 *  0.295  0.053 *  0.250  0.036 *  0.172  0.046 **  0.225  0.023  0.108
Reserves/M2  (-1.34)  (3.60)  (2.97)  (1.71)  (2.37)  (0.97)
Peso-Dollarlnterest  0.030 **  0.115  0.035  *  0.288  0.008  0.019  0.051 *  0.124  0.041 **  0.102  0.038 *  0.089
Rate Dilferential  2.13  (2.61)  (0.48)  (2.74)  (2.26)  (1.80)
I.ag(Capihal/Asscts)  -0.011  -0.127  -()oll  I  -t).126  0.()15  0.172  0t.)17  0.186  00.(29  *  0.321  0.()(1  0.009
(-1.05)  (-1.66)  (1.24)  (1.33)  (2.14)  (0.08)
Lag(Non-perforrning  -0.003  -0.034  0.008 *  0.117  -0.017  *  -0.344  -0.010  -0.224  -0.010 *  -0.218  -0.009 *  -0.184
LoanslTotal  Loans)  (-0.51)  (2.73)  (-3.59)  (-2.55)  (-2.62)  (-1. 78)
Lag(Real Estate  0.004  0.040  0.007  **  0.082  -0.005  -0.057  -0.003  -0.039  -0.007  -0.088  -0.003  -0.038
Loans/Total  Loans)  (1.17)  (2.41)  (-1.45)  (-0.65)  (-1.63)  (-0.52)
Lag(Personal  -0.001  -0,017  0.004 *  0.054  -0.002  -0.039  -0.006  -0.067  0.000  0.005  -0.008  -0.093
Loans/Total  Loans)  (-0.48)  (1.  78)  (-0.54)  (-1.13)  (0.09)  (-1.18)
Lag(Retum/Assets)  0.000  0.003  -0.003  -0.074  0.004  0.063  0.005  0.072  0.004  0.064  -0.003  -0.041
(0.11)  (-1.44)  (0.44)  (0.58)  (0.47)  (-0.86)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.008 **  0.102  0.000  0.001  0.007  0.056  0.002  0.015  0.006  0.047  0.001  0.006
(2.21)  (0.02)  (1.60)  (0.30)  (1.09)  (0.09)
Lag(Bonds/Assets)  -0.001  -0.007  0.004  0.037  0.012 +  0.141  0.006  0.072  0.011  +  0.140  0.002  0.026
(-0.10)  (0.83)  (2.80)  (1.06)  (2.18)  (0.29)
Lag(Expenditure/  0.018  0.034  0.072 **  0.180  0.008  0.036  -0.020  -0.077  -0.018  -0.068  -0.004  -0.016
Assets)  (1.02)  (3.75)  (0.59)  (-1.03)  (-0.77)  (-0.30)
Lag(LogofAssetsin  0.222  0.157  0.422  *  0.289  0.517*  0.311  0.439*  0.265  0.499**  0.307  0.137  0.082
Dollars)  (1.54)  (3.62)  (1.84)  (1.92)  (2.02)  (0.73)
Adjusted  -s.ua  .. d  0.  985  0. 80  ""  09 8  0.974i0.978.0.9
F- Fixed Effects  50.597  47.139  75.887  39.276  56.583  24.929 *+
F- Macro Variables  6.671 *  29.091 *  2.580 *  4.842  *  8.893 *  3.792 m
F-Bank Fundamentals  2.559 *  10.925  "*  10.421  *  4.710  8  8.982 +  2.302
F-(Macro+System)  10.549 *  23.261 *  2.122 *  4.050 *  7.556 *  3.356 *
Chi-Hausman  42.643 *  57.897 *  5.147  54.822  12.117  35.557 *
Number of banks  158  162  90  91  87  82
Number of observations  791  1120  507  511  491  465
T-statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors-White  correction for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1  percent level of significance, respectively.Table III: Chile -Panel Estimates  for Real Peso Deposits
Jun. 81- Nov. 86  Feb. 91 - Nov.96
_____________  ~~<  120U  >UF  F  > 120U&<50U  > 1,500 UF
Variables  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients
Cash Outside Banks/System  Deposits  .0056  0.011  -0.057  *  -0.119  -0.096  ***  -0.202  -0.092  ***  -0.212  -0.097  *  -0.175
(0.39)  (-1.91)  (-4.67)  (-3.97)  (-4 15)
Stock Market Index/CPI  0.539 ***  0.209  -0.052  -0.031  -0.095  -0.057  -0.119  -0.077  -0.091  -0.046
(6.31)  (-0.39)  (-0.92)  (-1.  11)  (-0.75)
Central Bank Reserves/M2  -0.006 **  -0.053  0.006 *  0.080  0.004  0.057  0.006 **  -0.097  0.005  0.057
(-2.01)  (1.72)  (1.61)  (2.08)  (1.61)
Peso-Dollar  Interest Rate Differential  -0.000  -0.008  0.005 *  0.117  -0.002  -0.063  0.003  0.071  -0.003  -0.058
(-O.  19)  (I.87)  (_.I I9)  (I.09)  (-1.12)
Lag(Capital/Assets)  -0.00  -0.194  0.011  *  0.191  0.012  **  0.213  0.014 ***  0.275  0.016  **  0.241
(-1.55)  (1.  70)  (2.12)  (2.89)  (2.27)
Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.007  -0.091  -0.004  -0.015  0.016  0.057  -0.027  -0.103  0.025  0.075
(-1.38)  (-0.22)  (1.18)  (-1.26)  (1.46)
Lag(Return/Assets)  -0.004  -0.029  0.106 *  0.196  0.055 *  0.103  0.060 *  0.123  0.044  0.069
(-1.40)  (3.17)  (1.95)  (1.91)  (1.34)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.015  ***  0.599  0.005 **  0.112  0.007  **  0.154  0.005  *  0.117  0.007  **  0.141
(3.45)  (1.97)  (2.41)  (1.88)  (2.17)
Lag(Investmnent/Assets)  0.006 ***  0.192  -0.002  -0.066  0.001  0.050  -0.002  -0.093  0.001  0.042
(3.24)  (-0.78)  (0.76)  (-1.36)  (0.63)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  -0.003 **  -0.416  -0.010 *  -0.121  0.003  0.044  0.001  0.007  0.006  0.062
(-2.10)  (-1.75)  (0.75)  (0.  1o)  (1.09)
Lag( Log of(Assets/CPI))  0.566  ***  0.583  0.425 **  0.323  1.023 ***  0.787  0.709 ***  0.592  1.210 ***  0.793
(8.47)  (3.75)  (10.14)  (6.49)  (10.  04)
Ad usted R-s uared  0.928  0.98  1  0976  0.98490.964
F- Fixed Effects  48.770***  158.99  ***  60.954***  129.29 ***  53.509***
F- Macro Variables  18.62 ***  3.104  **  1.396  3.836 ***  1.295
F-BankFundamentals  19.08  5.687***  16.024***  12.165***  15.385***
F-(Macro+System)  20.11  ***  3.012  **  7.545 ***  6.569 ***  5.692  ***
Chi-Hausman  10.765  **  41.703  ***  0.708  7.068  279.47  ***
Number  of banks  40  33  33  33  33
Number  of observations  1406  556  556  556  556
T-statistics  are in parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White correction  for heteroskedasticity.
*,* *,  **+ indicate 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance,  respectively.Table IV: Chile - Panel Estimates  for Dollar Deposits
Feb. 91 - Nov. 96
--  <US$2,00-0  > US$2,000  &  T  US$-'''''
.__________________  <US$30,000
Variables  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients
Cash Outside Banks/System  Deposits  0.179  0.330  0.10***  0.258  0.097  0.105
(5.18)  (4.09)  (1.54)
Stock Market Index in Dollars  -0.175 *  -0.138  -0.080  -0.086  -0.105  -0.049
(-1.85)  (-1.02)  (-0.48)
Central Bank Reserves/M2  0.002  0.021  0.002  0.036  0.019 ***  0.143
(0.46)  (0.73)  (2.88)
Peso-Dollar  Interest Rate Differential  0.014 ***  0.303  0.008 ***  0.226  0.016 ***  0.209
(4.50)  (3.14)  (2.78)
Lag(Capital/Assets)  0.009  0.144  0.004  0.083  0.012  0.113
(1.41)  (0.94)  (1.15)
Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.020  -0.061  0.016  0.070  0.042  0.077
(-1.41)  (1.38)  (1.34)
Lag(Retumr  Assets)  -0.045  -0.073  0.048 *  0.107  0.059  0.057
(-1.38)  (1.73)  (0.91)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  -0.000  -0.002  -0.002  -0.056  -0.016 ***  -0.180
(-0.05)  (-1.07)  (-2.75)
Lag(Investment/Assets)  0.006 **  0.182  0.006 ***  0.248  0.009 **  0.162
(2.20)  (3.64)  (2.32)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  -0.014 **  -0.151  -0.013 ***  -0.196  0.007  0.043
(-2.16)  (-2.74)  (0.58)
Lag( Log of Assets in Dollars)  0.211 *  0.180  0.166 *  0.194  0.470 **  0.237
(1.86)  (1.94)  (2.14)
Adu  sted  .- s  qared  09 71  0.971  0.808
F- Fixed Effects  137.85  ***  149.78 ***  21.353 ***
F- Macro Variables  23.172***  9.494 ***  7.819***
F-Bank Fundamentals  4.919***  4.496***  3.854***
F-(Macro+System)  32.689 *  14.321 ***  6.981 *
Chi-Hausman  2.288  67.752 ***  6.161
Number of banks  33  33  33
Number of observations  556  556  556
T-statistics  are  in parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White correction  for heteroskedasticity.
*, **,  ***  indicate  10,  5, 1  percent  level  of significance,  respectively.Table V: Mexico -Panel Estimates for Real Total Deposits
Mar. 91-Sep. 94  Mar. 91-Sep. 95  Dec. 95 - Mar. 98
..........  .........  ........  ............................................ I  .....................  .............................................. I..............  ,,,..............  1. ....................................................
12 banks  12 banks  12 banks  38 banks
Variables  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized  Within  Standardized
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients
Cash Outside Banks/System  Deposits  -0.014  -0.052  -0.022  -0.083  0.019  0.096  0.078 *  0.118
(-0.76)  (-1.31)  (0.90)  (1.73)
Stock Market Index/CPI  0.786 *  0.347  0.225  0.997  -0.097  -0.050  0.895  0.172
(1.80)  (1.29)  (-0.27)  (1.19)
Central Bank Reserves/M2  0.005  0.037  -0.012 ***  -0.142  0.028  0.359  -0.047  -0.238
(0.29)  (-2.60)  (1.39)  (-1.33)
Peso-Dollar  Interest Rate Differential  0.042 *  0.264  -0.000  -0.014  -0.006  -0.290  -0.014 **  -0.185
(1.66)  (-0.16)  (-1.61)  (-2.47)
Lag(Capital/Assets)  0.049 ***  0.182  -0.009  -0.004  0.032  0.203  -0.002  -0.031
(2.72)  (-0.44)  (1.29)  (-0.20)
Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total Loans)  -0.032 ***  -0.204  -0.000  -0.003  -0.007  -0.138  -0.024 ***  -0.132
(-2.73)  (-0.05)  (-1.36)  (-2.62)
Lag(Housing  Loans/Total  Loans)  0.009  0.104  0.002  0.028  0.002  0.099  0.009 **  0.096
(1.40)  (0.48)  (0.88)  (2.52)
Lag(Consumption  Loans/Total  Loans)  0.077 ***  0.340  0.037 ***  0.210  0.086 ***  0.517  0.004  0.036
(5.  79)  (2.59)  (3.89)  (0.52)
Lag(Commercial  Loans/Total Loans)  0.003 *  0.085  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.088  -0.001  -0.032
(1.90)  (0.05)  (0.73)  (-0.42)
Lag(Return  over Assets)  -0.040  -0.063  0.012  0.022  -0.077 ***  -0.447  -0.017  -0.064
-0.66)  0.20)  (-4.63)  (-0.59)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.049  ***  0.239  0.042 ***  0.180  -0.004  -0.058  -0.004  -0.057
(3.21)  (3.15)  (-0.49)  (-0.58)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.030 *  -0.214  0.089 ***  0.327
(0.00)  (0.03)  (-1.92)  (3.92)
Lag(Logof(Assets/CPI))  1.381  ***  0.959  1.046***  0.804  0.614***  0.515  0.159  0.116
(10.52)  (7.99)  (3.54)  (0.76)
Adjusted R-squared  0.969  0.960  0.979  0.949
F- Fixed Effects  27.371  ***  31.487  ***  10.093  *  12.527 ***
F- Macro Variables  3.210  **  3.455 **  2.790  **  2.653  **
F-Bank Fundamentals  8.271  ***  4.593 ***  8.105  ***  5.023 ***
F-(Macro+System)  2.421  *  2.630  **  2.204 *  2.221  *
Chi-Hausman  12.062**  0.311  27.111  ***  74.781  ***
Number  of banks  12  12  12  38
Number  of observations  144  192  98  291
T-statistics  are in  parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White correction  for  heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate 10,5, 1  percent level of significance,  respectively.Table VI: Percentage  of Variance  Explained by Bank Fundamentals
ARGENTINA
June  1993-  June  1993-  <10,000  >20,000  >20,000  &  >100,000
Sept.  1994  Mar.95  < 100,000
Peso Deposits  3.21  6.86  74.79  69.59  57.5  68.57
Dollar  Deposits  5.09  31.72  69.79  42.73  45.1  24.83
CHILE
June  1981-  February  1991 - November  1996
November  1986  Peso Deposits  (UF)  Dollar  Deposits
Total  Deposits  <120  >120  >120 &  >1,500  <2,000  >2,000 &  >30,000
<1,500  < 30,000
10.87  38.18  18.63  25.53  20.24  8.04  15.65  37.83
MEXICO
12 banks  38 banks
Mar  91-  Mar.  91 - Dec. 95 - Dec. 95 -
Sep. 94  Sep. 95  Mar.  98  Mar.  98
Total  Deposits  21.23  7.06  86.39  87.48
Note: The figures indicate the percentage of the adjusted  R-squared explained  by bank fundamentals,  once we control for the fixed
effects. A first regression is run with macroeconomic  and systemic  variables, then we add bank fundamentals  and compute the
percentage increase in the adjusted  R-squared.Table VII: Argentina - GMM Estimates - Arellano and Bover (1995)
Peso Deposits:  June 1995  - March 1997  Dollar Deposits: June 1995 - March 1997
Variables  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-  ----------  .......-..............
Variables  ---  --- c-$10,000  - ---- 00  >-20,000 &  o,boo  <US$10,000  . U  S  &  s  U  ,0
<$100,000  <US$100,000
Cash Outside Banks/System  Deposits  0.017  -0.006  -0.004  -0.028  -0.009  -0.015  -0.009  -0.082
(1.35)  (-0.32)  (-0.29)  (-1.46)  (-0.48)  (-1.34)  (-0.88)  (-2.14)
Stock Market Index in Dollars  -0.391  -0.325  -0.853 *  -0.505 *  -0.319  -0.537 ***  -0.185  -1.464
(-1.44)  (-1.  19)  (-3.09)  (-1.72)  (-0.88)  (-3.28)  (-1.00)  (-1.61)
Central Bank Reserves/M2  -0.026  -0.021  -0.014  0.026  0.026  0.03 *  0.018  0.106
(-1.30)  (-0.84)  (-0.77)  (0.96)  (1.04)  (1.989)  (1.28)  (2.52)
Peso-Dollar  Interest Rate Differential  -0.15 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.198 ***  -0.09 **  -0.044  -0.002  -0.013  -0.022
(-4.81)  (-3.72)  (-7.85)  (-2.79)  (-1.12)  (-0.163)  (-1.01)  (-0.42)
Lag(Capital/Assets)  -0.003  0.001  -0.012  0.034 ***  0.015  0.006  0.078 ***  0.013
(-0.219)  (0.11)  (-0.61)  (2.59)  (0.49)  (0.81)  (5.88)  (0.42)
Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total Loans)  0.029 ***  -0.005  0.003  -0.017 *  0.011  -0.011 ***  0.004  -0.024
(4.58)  (-1.38)  (0.94)  (-4.4)  (1.37)  (-3.39)  (1.13)  (-3.26)
Lag(Real  Estate Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.038 ***  -0.017 ***  -0.008 **  -0.006  -0.006  -0.01 **  -0.013 ***  -0.004
(-4.47)  (-3.08)  (-2.01)  (-0.86)  (-0.29)  (-2.53)  (-2.64)  (-0.31)
Lag(Personal  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.006  0.012 ***  0.018 *  0.006  -0.011  -0.011 **  0.001  -0.014
(-1.256)  (3.00)  (2.74)  (0.98)  (-1.33)  (-3.02)  (0.25)  (-L 77)
Lag(Retumn/Assets)  0.026  0.007  0.055 *  0.039  *  -0.077  -0.018  0.024 **  0.019
(1.00)  (0.37)  (2.79)  (2.2)  (-1.27)  (-1.32)  (2.18)  (0.26)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.003  -0.008  0.014  0.019  0.034 **  0.026 **  0.016  0.111
(0,27)  (-0.37)  (0.9)  (0.97)  (1.98)  (2.13)  (1.41)  (2.43)
Lag(Bonds/Assets)  0.029 ***  -0.01  -0.007  0.006  0.034 *  -0.006  0.03 *  -0.029
(3.43)  (-1.34)  (-0.87)  (1.15)  (1.89)  (-1.35)  (5.12)  (-0.88)
Lag(Expenditure/  Assets)  0.019  -0.016  0.041 ***  -0.004  -0.041  0.015 *  0.016 *  0.069
(1.03)  (-1.59)  (2.61)  (-0.25)  (-0.99)  (2.14)  (1.81)  (0.69)
Lag(Logof(Assets/CPI))  0.995 **  1.199 ***  0.863 *  1.144  ***  1.103 ***  1.083 ***  1.235 ***  1.095
(12.17)  (17.33)  (14.51)  (14.37)  (7.53)  (20.93)  (20.83)  (10.36)
.-..-  . --  - .,-------.,-  .-. ~  ~  ~~~-T6  4s.-  - .....  ........  -.  ......-- ,.......  - ...  ....  . .. ...............  -.  - . .-  .-.-.. ,-  . 1 .7
Saga~T  testl~~  ~~  ~  ~~~~~  ~  ~~  ~  ~  ~~  20.45  - --  30.57  - ----  292  344  23.48  2  4  32.77
Serial  correlation  test'  -0.76  -0.344  -1.733  0.629  -0.52  -0.522  0.176  0.056
Waldtestfor  bank fundamentals (excluding logof  45.86 ***  28.22 *  42.89  *  56.15 *  23.99 ***  62.48 *  123.99 *  44.89
assets)
Number  of observations  233  236  227  215  233  236  227  215
T-statistics  arc in parentheses.  Robust standard errors-White  correction for heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1  percent level of significance,  respectively.
1. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
2. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.Table  VIII:  Chile  & Mexico - GMM  Estimates  - Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)
Chile  Mexico
June  1981-  February  1991 - November  1996
Nov.  1986
Variables  .. <120  UF  >i20UF  >i2OUF  &  >1500  UF  US000  >US$2000&  Tus$30,0oo  Variables  December  1995
_________<1500  UF  <US$30,000  - March  1998
Cash Outside  Banks/System  Deposits  0.039  **  -0.056  0.022  -0.047  **  0.014  -0.056  0.004  -0.234  Cash Outside  Banks/System  Deposits  0.059
(2.96)  (-0.65)  (0.33)  (-2.22)  (0.16)  (-0.65)  (0.07)  (-1.28)  (1.57)
Stock Market  Index/CPI  0.832  ***  -0.49  **  -0.059  -0.467  ***  -0.129  -0.437  **  -0.231  -0.454  *  Stock Market  Index/CPI  0.887  **
(4.72)  (-2.78)  (-0.28)  (-4.78)  (-0.59)  (-2.55)  (-1.58)  (-1.67)  (2.31)
Central  Bank  Reserves/M2  -0.007  **  0.009  -0.003  0.007  ***  -0.005  0.004  0.001  -0.003  Central  Bank  Reserves/M2  -0.003
(-2.11)  (2.77)  (-0.53)  (4.29)  (-0.65)  (0.08)  (0.29)  (-0.167)  (-0.09)
Peso-Dollar  Interest  Rate  Differential  0.001  0.004  **  -0.005  0.007  ***  -0.003  0.01  **  0.009  **  0.007  Peso-Dollar  Interest  Rate  Differential  -0.037  *
(1.39)  (1.45)  (-1.29)  (4.15)  (-0.77)  (2.26)  (2.22)  (0.9)  (-2.72)
Lag(Capital/Assets)  0.044  ***  0.034  *  0.055  ***  0.028 ***  0.064  **  -0.067  **  -0.02  -0.057  *  Lag(Capital/Assets)  -0.004
(4.04)  (2.36)  (3.98)  (3.35)  (4.06)  (-2.24)  (-0.83)  (-1.76)  (-0.57)
Lag(Non-perforrning  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.021  ***  -0.046  **  -0.022  -0.014  -0.011  -0.172  **  -0.119  ***  -0.299  *  Lag(Non-performing  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.053  *
(-3.62)  (-1.39)  (-0.38)  (-0.73)  (-0.16)  (-2.54)  (-2.62)  (-2.96)  (-2.59)
Lag(Return/Assets)  -0.01  -0.007  ***  0.473  ***  -0.06  0.546  ***  -0.15  ***  -0.042  -0.389  Lag(Housing  Loans/Total  Loans)  0.026  ***
(-0.55)  (-0.06)  (4.104)  (-0.77)  (3.73)  (-0.64)  (-0.18)  (-0.98)  (3.10)
Lag(Cash/Assets)  0.019  -0.011  0.007  0.045  **  0.02  0.039  0.035  **  -0.029  Lag(Consumption  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.005
(0.66)  (-0.76)  (0.304)  (4.98)  (0.78)  (1.54)  (2.14)  (-0.59)  (-1.13)
Lag(Investment/Assets)  -0.022  **  0.00  ***  0.003  -0.007  *  -0.008  0.034  ***  0.019  **  0.029  **  Lag(Commercial  Loans/Total  Loans)  -0.002
(-3.13)  (0.026)  (0.24)  (-1.84)  (-0.53)  (2.69)  (2.38)  (2.09)  (-0.9)
Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  0.012  *  -0.009  *  -0.044  *  0.015  *  -0.024  0.051  *  0.033  0.084  Lag(Retum  over  Assets)  -0.035
(1.90)  (-0.81)  (-1.68)  (1.95)  (-0.75)  (1.66)  (1.47)  (1.39)  (-1.06)
Lag(Logof(Assets/CPI))  1.291  *  1.57  **  1.173  ***  1.66  ***  1.159  ***  0.466  **  0.432  ***  0.129  Lag(Cash/Assets)  -0.007
(9.65)  (11.03)  (7.94)  (15.03)  (6.81)  (2.51)  (2.81)  (0.55)  (-1.44)
Siiit  1406  967  18.05  10.12  1552  2.78  1274  Lag(Expenditure/Assets)  -0.056  218
Serial correlation  test
2 0.857  -0.733  1.033  -1.344  1.012  -1.463  0.203  -1.496  (-2.73)
Wald testfor  bank  fundamentals  46.85  ***  17.09  ***  79.79  ***  46.17  ***  65.06  ***  38.39  33.65  ***  26.17  ***
(excluding  log of assets)  Lag( Log  of (Assets/CPI))  1.073  ***
N-m  e  fo  sra  n  9  9  9  9  9  913131................................................t....  ..... 0.....2.1...1........1.201.2.. 1 1 UHIVUW  VI UUIWV.YaUII  L  ""  - J  ,  I  l  l  -I  l-'1.I  I
T-statistics  are  in parentheses.  Robust  standard  errors-White  corecti  for beteroskedasticityIsargan  test'  14.10
*, **,  *** indicate  10,  5, 1 percent  level of  significance,  respectively.  ISerial  correlation  test
2 0.493
1. The null hypothesis  is that  the instruments  used  are not correlated  with  the residuals.  F-Bank  Fundamentals  65.74  ** 
2. The null hypothesis  is that  the errors  in the first difference  regression  exhibit  no second  order  serial  correlation.  Number  of observations  177Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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